























Ruth McNally & Uwe Sondermann

Uxbridge/Middlesex (UK) & Essen (D)
October 1999

Study performed as part of the PROTEE-Project,
partly funded by the European Commission DG VII-Transport






 TOC \o "1-2" 1. Introduction	4
Concepts and Limitations	4
The Indicators used in the KFHS Case Study	6
The Structure of this Report	9
2. Developing Methodology through the KFHS Case Study	10
Data Collection	10
Application of the Indicators	11
The Interface Meeting	15
Lessons	16
3. The Innovator’s Story	20
The Krupp Fast Handling System	20
4. The Consensus Story	23
The Krupp Fast Handling System Consensus Story	24
5. The Socio-Techno-Therapeutic Dialogue	32
The Krupp Fast Handling System Dialogue	32







List of Tables and Figures
Page
 TOC \t "Figure;1" \c "Abbildung" Table 1.1: Summary of STEMM Indicators	7
Figure 3.1: Krupp Fast Handling Terminal (Model with Compact Storage)	22
Figure 4.1: Picture of the High Rack System picked up from the first brochure	26
Figure 4.2: Opening of the Pilot Plant in Duisburg-Rheinhausen	28
Figure 5.1: Turning Points mirrored against initial schedule	33
Figure 5.2: Pilot Plant of the Krupp Fast Handling System	38
Figure 5.3: Photograph of approach to the KFHS test plant	40
Figure 5.4: Photograph of railway side of KFHS test plant and hoisting mechanism	41
Figure 5.5: View of a conventional rail-road terminal	42
Figure 5.6: Simplified Organigramm of German Railway Authority – Deutsche
Bundesbahn in 1991	45
Figure 5.7: Simplified Organigramm of DB AG Holding with Separate Units in 1998	46






A Case Study on the Krupp Fast Handling System
Ruth McNally​[1]​ & Uwe Sondermann​[2]​
1. Introduction
This Report is about the PROTEE case study on the Krupp Fast Handling System (KFHS) project, which was part of Work Package 2A. The objective in undertaking case studies in the PROTEE project is two-fold: to develop procedures for using PROTEE on innovation pro​jects; and to develop and test a set of Indicators for defining the quality of the learning curve of such projects. ​[3]​ Therefore, PROTEE case studies are not conventional because the primary objective in undertaking them is not to develop the case studies per se, but to use the case studies as a vehicle to develop the PROTEE instrument. In order to do this, the projects used as case studies are, of course, subject to a PROTEE-type analysis which may yield critical perspectives on the projects. However, wherever possible, such perspectives are themselves treated as additional ways of testing PROTEE rather than as new insights into the project. An invaluable opportunity to test PROTEE-generated insights into a project is provided by the inclusion of industrial partners in three of the PROTEE case studies, including the KFHS case study. Such partners are able to use their experiences of working on the innovation projects used as case studies in PROTEE as the basis for making critical feedback on the novelty, validity and utility of PROTEE approaches and analyses.
Concepts and Limitations
The KFHS case study is a case study on methodology: it is a case study on PROTEE methodology which uses the KFHS project as a vehicle. At each stage of the project we were developing and testing procedures for PROTEE through the procedures used for the case study. We have tried to execute present the KFHS case study as if it were an innovation project being managed using PROTEE. However, there are three important ways in which the KFHS case study differs from the innovation projects it is trying to model. 
The first difference concerns the Indicators. In the case study, we were simultaneously both developing a set of PROTEE Indicators and developing procedures for their use. As was stated in the PROTEE General Interim Report, PROTEE has no real precursor. When we started the case study there was only ERANIT, which ‘was too intellectual to be testable’ and STEMM which was ‘too cumbersome’ and which was developed for infrastructure rather than innovation projects. ​[4]​ Therefore, when we began the case study a set of innovation project Indicators did not exist, and the set of Indicators remained in a state of flux throughout the duration of the case study. Whilst this uncertainty over the set of Indicators was inevitable, it nonetheless created important and unavoidable differences between the Indicators used in the KFHS case study and Indicators constructed as a result of the experience of doing the KFHS and other case studies. 
The second difference between the KFHS project and the innovation projects PROTEE concerns the dimension of time. Whilst the KFHS case study is a retrospective case study, PROTEE is designed as a real-time management tool for innovation projects which are ongoing in the present. The historical nature of the KFHS project not only limited the extent to which the case study could be used as a model for PROTEE procedures as applied to real time projects, it also emerged as a potential limitation in evaluating the Indicators them​selves, as will be discussed in this Report. 
The third difference between the use of PROTEE in the KFHS case study and the future use of PROTEE in innovation projects is that the objective of the ‘learning pact’ in the KFHS case study was to test and develop PROTEE itself rather than to evaluate the learning trajectory of the KFHS project. 
Notwithstanding these differences, we have designed the execution and presentation of the KFHS case study to develop, test and demonstrate PROTEE propositions ​[5]​(or principles) and procedures for using PROTEE on innovation projects in the future. 
One way in we have done this is to exploit and bring to the fore the way in which the PRO​TEE roles of ‘Innovator’ and ‘Evaluator’ are reproduced in the partnership responsible for the KFHS case study. Work on case studies in PROTEE Work Package 2A, which includes the KFHS case study, has been a collaboration between two types of PROTEE partners: acade​mics or analysts from Brunel University, Ecole Nationale Superieure des Mines de Paris, Maastricht University and Technicatome​[6]​; and industrialists from Krupp Fördertechnik GmbH, Zentrum fur Innovative Verkehrslösungen, and Mondragon Sistemas. The productive tension between these two types of partner often manifested itself in the development of this case study as a divide. ​[7]​ In undertaking this case study we have used this divide to model the key relationship in the PROTEE approach, namely, the relationship between the Innovator and the Evaluator, and in writing this Report we have used this divide to create and illustrate the roles of the PROTEE Innovator and Evaluator and to make the description of this case study a risky description. 
We have also used the similarities between the roles of client and therapist in psychotherapy, and the Innovator and Evaluator in PROTEE to develop the concept of PROTEE as socio-techno-therapy. 
The Indicators used in the KFHS Case Study
When the KFHS case study was started, the available Indicators comprised a set of so-called ‘notions’ developed through two previous projects, ERANIT and STEMM. ​[8]​ The objective was that through the experience of the KFHS case study and the other PROTEE case studies, these notions, which were developed for transport infrastructure projects, would be tested and developed into a set of Indicators for innovation projects in intermodal freight transport. 
In the Piloting Document, ​[9]​ the ‘notions’ were given as: 




These four notions, described in subsequent PROTEE documents as ‘Classes’, were expanded in a set of documents produced by Technicatome in March 1998. ​[10]​ Minor amend​ments to this set of Indicators were discussed at the Working Group in April 1998. ​[11]​ These amendments included the renaming of the four Classes and the rearrangement of certain Indicators within those Classes. Further minor amendments were again suggested at the Working Group in September 1998. ​[12]​ However, these amendments were both minor and partial, and the March version of the Indicators remained the only comprehensive set of Indi​cators translated in English until November 1998, when the experiences of using the STEMM indicators on PROTEE case studies, including the KFHS case study, resulted in the writing of the first set of PROTEE Indicators. ​[13]​ Whilst these new Indicators were informed by feedback from the KFHS case study, they were drafted too late to test the procedures used in this case study. Therefore, the Indicators used in the KFHS case study were the STEMM Indicators which, although undergoing rearrangement and renaming, remained largely as described in the March documentation. 
The set of STEMM Indicators from the March documentation is summarised in the Table below. As you can see, it comprises four Classes, which are listed in the left-hand column. Within each Class are three or four Indicators, which are listed in the central column, and most of the Indicators are further subdivided into two or more Variables, resulting in a total of 28 Variables. For each Variable, a set of options, corresponding to possible features of the project, were described in the documentation. Each such feature was given a value which was colour-coded. The colours used in the coding were red, orange and green, their symbo​lism being acquired from the meanings of those colours in traffic lights - an appropriate meta​phor, perhaps, in a project about transport. The value assigned to each feature was informed by experience from previous research on transport infrastructure projects. The concept in STEMM is that the Evaluator (Administrator) should use the documentation both as a frame​work for organising and evaluating features of the project. That is to say, he or she should organise the various features of the project in relation to STEMM Variables so that they can be colour coded. The result would be a visual guide to the state of the project at a particular point in time. A large number of red codings would be a warning signal for the project at that time. This set of Indicators and with this concept of project evaluation as being a task under​taken by the Evaluator (Administrator) using predetermined values was the starting point for the KFHS case study. 






I. ADMINISTRATIVE 	1. Map of the AAP	Map of the AAP










CONNECTIVITY	1. Knowledge of allies & opponents	Knowledge of allies & opponents
	2. Links between the AAP & public authorities	Strength of support from public authorities
		Comparative links with public authorities compared to opponents
	3. Modes of interessement & 	Modes of interessement
	exclusion	Strength of support from outside of public authorities








ALTERNATIVES &	1. Plasticity	Modularity & interoperability
CONTROVERSIES	2. Plasticity: Variants	Knowledge of the variants
		Divergence of the variants from the project’s STE problematics
	3. Alternatives: Threat from potential controversies	Knowledge of the alternatives
		Divergence of alternatives from the project’s STE problematics
		Level of publicity about the alternative/ controversy
	4. Controversies: Monitoring public controversies	Knowledge of the controversies
		Tests to validate the information provided by representatives
		
IV. QUALITY OF THE DES​CRIPTION: CRITICITY & 	Quality of project descriptions	Number of dimensions – intradisciplinary criticity
RETROACTIVITY OF THE PROJECT 		Disciplinary heterogeneity – interdisciplinary criticity
(OUTLINES)	2. Quality of internal criticity	Internal management of the project
		Receptiveness to criticism






The Structure of this Report
The remainder of this Report is in two parts. One part is comprised of Section 2 and the other part is comprised of Sections 3-6. Lessons from this case study are given in two places in this Report: in Section 2 and in Section 6. 
Section 2 of this report is a description of how the KFHS case study was done. Lessons arising out of innovations in methodology are identified in boxes in italic font. These lessons are integrated within the description at the points where they occur. At the end of this section there is a summary of what was learnt from doing the case study and the first explanation of PROTEE as socio-techno-therapy.
The materials from the KFHS case study are presented in Sections 3, 4 and 5. One of the lessons that was learnt from doing the case study is that the transfer and transformation of the materials occurred in three moments. We suggest that these three moments are not only a part of this case study but are also moments in the PROTEE process more generally. Sections 3, 4 and 5 explain these moments more fully and illustrate them using material from the KFHS case study. The lessons learned from the material in Sections 3, 4 and 5 are given in Section 6.
The KFHS case study was undertaken by both academic and analyst partners and by indus​trial partners, in particular Brunel University and Krupp Fördertechnik. We exploited this feature to reproduce the PROTEE roles of Evaluator and Innovator in our development of the procedures for the case study and for PROTEE. The roles played by each type of partner were different but they were complementary, and both were crucial. In this Report we des​cribe how the division of roles between the academic and analyst partners and the industrial partners translates into the division of roles between the Evaluator and the Innovator. In section 5 we exploit this division of roles by maintaining separate voices for the Innovator and the Evaluator. Most importantly, in this Report we endeavour to abide by the key prin​ciple in PROTEE which is that the value of PROTEE is in the interaction between the Inno​vator and the Evaluator, a principle which was validated in this case study. We do this by consciously avoiding the use of a meta-narrative. We resist the temptation to write this Report from one perspective, or to elevate the perspective of one type of partner, for example the academic and analyst partner, over that of the other type of partner. Instead we have written a Report which does not privilege one voice over another, but which aims to be symmetrical in its representation of the roles and opinions of the two types of partner involved in this case study. 
2. Developing Methodology through the KFHS Case Study
The KFHS case study was one of the first PROTEE case studies to be undertaken. In under​taking this case study we developed a general methodology for PROTEE case studies. This methodology also informed our conceptualisation of PROTEE procedures when applied to innovation projects in the future. 
In this section we describe the methodology used for the KFHS case study, and explain the rationale for the innovations in the methodology we introduced. Inserted in boxes in italics throughout this section of the Report are the lessons we learned from developing a methodo​logy for the case study. Whilst some of these lessons were specific to PROTEE case studies, many form the basis for our conceptualisation of PROTEE as socio-techno-therapy, which is explained at the end of this Section and then explored further in Sections 3-6. 
Data Collection
The first task in the Work Programme was described as ‘data collection’ in the Piloting Document. ​[15]​ The first data collection on the KFHS case study was in the form of a report presented at the April Working Group by Krupp Fördertechnik. ​[16]​ This was followed by further data collection during a Technical Meeting hosted by Krupp Fördertechnik in Duisburg in May during which a visit to the KFHS test plant was made. ​[17]​ As a follow-up to the Duisburg Meeting, Krupp Fördertechnik provided additional documents giving data about the KFHS. ​[18]​ 
In both Paris and Duisburg, Uwe Sondermann was interviewed by academic and analyst partners from the PROTEE Consortium. ​[19]​ Although the interview questions were informed by a knowledge of the STEMM Indicators, the emphasis at this stage was on the transfer of information about the KFHS project from Krupp Fördertechnik to other partners in the PRO​TEE Consortium. It was a stage during which Uwe told the Consortium about the KFHS project; he was teaching the other partners about the KFHS project from the Krupp Förder​technik’s point of view. Acquisition of this information was a prerequisite to the testing of the Indicators on the case study. It was only as this information was transferred that the other Consortium members became able to identify which of the existing Indicators seemed to be applicable to the KFHS case study, and which new Indicators might need to be created if aspects of the case study were to be captured for the evaluation.
Although we would continue to collect data for the remainder of the case study, the Technical Meeting in Duisburg marked the completion of the task of data collection as a focus of activity on the KFHS project. After Duisburg we shifted our focus to the next task which was the application of the Indicators to the KFHS project. 
Application of the Indicators
The first application of the Indicators to the KFHS project was undertaken by immediately following the Duisburg Technical Meeting. At this stage in the PROTEE project, the Con​sortium envisaged that the points at which a case study would be evaluated would corres​pond to particular ‘events’ which, either at the time of their occurrence or retrospectively, were construed as ‘turning points’ in the project. ​[20]​ Therefore, as part of the analysis, Krupp Fördertechnik, as an Innovator, was asked to identify what he considered to be the key ‘turning points’ in the project and, in accordance with the ‘traffic light’ approach in the STEMM Indicator docu​ments, he colour-coded these turning points.​[21]​ 
From this point onward, the procedures used for the KFHS case study started to depart from the procedures advocated in the STEMM documentation. A new PROTEE methodology started to be developed through the case study.
The aim was that the academic and analyst partners would also apply the STEMM Indicators to the material on the KFHS case study. However, both sets of material were unwieldy. On the one hand, the material on the KFHS project consisted of a diverse set of documents in the form of reports and analyses, published documents, and proceedings of meetings. ​[22]​ On the other hand, there existed a thick text on each of the four STEMM Classes of Indicators, describing each Variable, potential features for each Variable, and how to evaluate each feature. ​[23]​ 
Lesson: In addition to the extensive, explanatory documents on the Indicators, there is a need for the Indicators to be available in a compact form, for example, as a table, crib sheet or as a set of prompts or questions, so that they are visible at a glance. 
The first innovation in methodology was to transform the STEMM Indicators into a more readily accessible and useable form. The result was a two page list which summarised the Classes, Indicators, and Variables, ​[24]​similar in format to Table 1.1. For the first time the entire set of Indicators and Variables became visible at a glance, instead of being inserted amongst thick texts. 
The second development in methodology concerned the organisation of the material about the KFHS project. Whilst the information in these documents was familiar to Uwe because of his knowledge of the KFHS project, it was relatively new and unfamiliar to the academic and analyst partners. This material was analysed and used to construct a sequence of ‘events’ in the history of the project which were arranged in chronological order. Thus, the material on the KFHS project was organised into a chronology of events. 
Lesson: Summarise the data gathered on the project by using it to construct a chronology of events.
The next development concerned the roles of both the Evaluator and the Indicators. The approach suggested in the STEMM documentation ​[25]​ is that the Evaluator would apply the project material to the Indicators. According to this approach, the Evaluator would identify events in the project history and the specific features of these events would be evaluated using values in the Indicator guide. Therefore the approach in STEMM seems to involve the Evaluator applying the Indicators and making an evaluation of events in the history of the project in isolation from the Innovator using an a priori set of values. This approach was rejected in the KFHS case study for two reasons. 
One reason is the Evaluator’s limited knowledge of the project by comparison with that of the Innovator. Given that this will inevitably be the state of affairs not just on the KFHS project but on all the projects for which PROTEE is designed, it was decided that it would be preferable for the Evaluator to apply the Indicators to the project material in the presence of the Innovator. This would prevent the wrong evaluation of an event by the Evaluator through ignorance of the project. By making the application of the Indicators to the project an inter​active event involving both the Innovator and the Evaluator a valuable heuristic opportunity was created for the both parties. 
Therefore, a new PROTEE procedure was suggested. In between the data collection stage and the evaluation stage, an additional stage was inserted. In this stage the Innovator and the Evaluator would participate in a dialogue about the application of the Indicators to the project. This procedure was piloted on the KFHS case study at the Mondragon Working Group in September. 
Lesson: Make the application of the Indicators to the project material an interactive process - an analytic dialogue - between the Innovator and the Evaluator rather than a process undertaken by the Evaluator in isolation.
The second reason why the STEMM approach was modified concerns the role of the STEMM Indicators themselves. The STEMM documentation aims to provide comprehensive guidance on how to evaluate a project by providing a set of values for all of the possible features of the project. It provides a set of a priori values derived from infrastructure projects. This set of values was inappropriate for the evaluation of changes in the quantity and quality of information during the innovation process, which was the objective of PROTEE evaluation. A PROTEE evaluation is a comparison of an innovation project at two different time points, not a static evaluation at a single time point. The evaluation process in PROTEE would involve a different set of Indicators from those in STEMM, the creation of which was one of the aims of the PROTEE project. However, at this stage in the PROTEE project, a set of PROTEE Indicators was not yet available. The drafting of this set of Indicators would be informed by the experience of the KFHS case study. However, all that was available for the KFHS case study was the set of STEMM Indicators. So we started to modify how they were used. 
Our approach was effectively to separate the documentation on the STEMM Indicators into two parts. The part which identified and described the Classes of Indicators and their Vari​ables was used for the KFHS case study, but the part which assigned values was not used. The list of STEMM Indicators was used as an aid to thinking about, developing insights into, and posing questions to stimulate discussion about the material, but the sets of values - the colour coding - was not used to evaluate the case study material. 
Lesson: Separate the list of STEMM Indicators from the suggested values and use only the list, not the values. Use the list of STEMM Indicators to generate insights into and as the basis for questions about the material. 
In a STEMM evaluation, the project material is applied to the framework of Indicators. The end result of a STEMM evaluation is a matrix of ‘traffic light’ colours framed by the Indicator Variables along one axis and events in time along the other. The chronology of events in the KFHS project seemed to involve only a limited number of elements (or Actors) who had been involved in the KFHS project. These included the project Team, the Steering Committee, the Working Group, the German railway companies, the test plant, competitors, and the glossary on intermodal transport. There did not seem to be enough events and elements in the project to which to apply all the Indicators without repeatedly evaluating the same event or element. Our aim was to apply the Indicators to the project as part of an interactive process. These elements seemed to be more ‘natural’ nuclei around which to structure an interactive dia​logue. Therefore in the KFHS case study, instead of using the set of Indicators as the frame​work for analysis, we structured the analysis around key elements from the KFHS project. These elements were used as the kernels around which concepts from the Indicators were introduced into the dialogue as questions. 
Lesson: The case study material may yield only a limited number of elements, or actors. Use these to as the nuclei around which to structure the basis for a dialogue informed by questions from the Indicators. Use the Indicators selectively, and apply them to the project material, rather than applying the project material to the Indicators.
Using these innovations in the procedures for the use of the Indicators, an academic/analyst and industrial partner interaction on the KFHS case study was prepared for a session at the PROTEE Working Group in Mondragon in September 1998. A Technical Meeting was hosted at Brunel University on 8-9 September 1998 in preparation for this. It was attended by Ruth McNally, Steve Woolgar, Philippe Laredo and Solange Martin. ​[26]​ The preparation and organi​sation of the session in Mondragon are going to be described in some detail because they incorporate features designed to realise a number of aims.
The session was led by Ruth McNally and was closely based on a report, a copy of which was given to each person present. ​[27]​ The provision of the report to those present was con​sidered to be an important methodological consideration because it provided those present with a record of the content of the presentation which they could annotate and refer to.
Lesson: Provide all present at the interaction meeting with a report on the substance of what is to be discussed at the meeting.
The presentation and the report it was based on were structured in two parts. In the first part, Brunel presented a chronology of events in the KFHS project. Whilst the presentation of the chronology provided the Consortium members with an overview of the KFHS project, this was not its primary aim. If that had been the primary aim it would have been more practical for Uwe Sondermann, who is far more knowledgeable about the history of the KFHS project, to have presented the overview. Indeed, the chronology Ruth presented was based entirely on information originally supplied to her by Krupp Fördertechnik. It was precisely because Uwe is the expert on the history of the KFHS project that it was important for Ruth to retell the history. Through this reversal of the obvious roles the primary aim of the exercise were achieved which to provide an opportunity for Uwe and Ruth to agree on a consensus version of the project’s history. The preparation of the chronology alerted Ruth to events about which she was uncertain, and the presentation provided her with the opportunity to ask Uwe for clarification on these events. Moreover, the presentation of her understanding of the history of the project to Uwe revealed aspects with which Uwe disagreed and provided him with the opportunity to correct them. 
With regard to the development of PROTEE procedures, it was foreseen that this retelling of the project’s history by Evaluator to the Innovator could also be an important trust-building exercise. This is because it provides an opportunity for the Innovator to demonstrate his or her grasp of critical events in the project’s history, and it is both transparent and democratic in allowing the Innovator to share in the production of the information on which the evaluation is to be based and be reassured that this information is accurate. Moreover, although the Innovator knows the history of his or her own innovation project very well, there is still the possibility that he or she will gain new insights by hearing it told by an outsider.
The second part of the presentation at the Mondragon Working Group was designed to stimulate a dialogue about the application of the STEMM Indicators to the KFHS project. As described above, concepts from the Indicators were introduced into the dialogue as ques​tions about events concerning key elements from the KFHS project. As with the chronology part of the presentation, this part of the presentation was very closely based on the report. ​[28]​ Before commencing the dialogue, Ruth first presented all the points and questions for discussion, allowing intervention only for clarification. This presentation provided everyone present with an overview of the scope of the interaction before the interaction commenced. 
Lesson: Before commencing the Dialogue, first present all the material in the report to give an overview of what is planned. 
The report both served to organise and provide reference material for the subsequent interaction, which involved not just Brunel and Krupp Fördertechnik GmbH but all the members of the Consortium. One interesting observation was that during the interaction the different orientations of the academic/analyst partners and the industrial partners in the PROTEE consortium recreated the roles of Evaluator and Innovator, respectively. ​[29]​
The Interface Meeting
The innovations in the PROTEE procedure tested and demonstrated at the session on the KFHS case study at the Mondragon Working Group were endorsed by the Consortium as being a good example of the PROTEE methodology. They were both compatible with and informed the emergent set of PROTEE propositions which were drafted in November. ​[30]​ 
The next task was to test the procedures and analysis developed through the KFHS case study by seeking critical feedback from a broader panel of personnel from Krupp Förder​technik who had played key roles in the KFHS project. This test, called an ‘Interface Meeting’, took in December 1998 at Krupp Fördertechnik in Essen, Germany. It was called an ‘Interface Meeting’ because it comprised KF personnel (including Uwe), representing the Innovators on the one hand, and academic and analyst members of the PROTEE Consortium, representing the Evaluators, on the other. ​[31]​
The format for the Meeting was based on the format endorsed by the Consortium at the Working Group in Mondragon. Once again, the presentation was based on a report, a copy of which was given to each person present. ​[32]​ The report was in two parts - a chronology section and a section designed to stimulate the interaction. First of all the chronology section was presented to the Innovators, comments and corrections were invited, and a consensus chronology was easily reached. Then the interaction section of the report was presented. There then followed a discussion of each of the questions raised in the report. Subsequently, the KF personnel were invited to give their critical feedback on the Interface Meeting. The content of the analysis and the proceedings of the Mondragon Working Group and the Inter​face Meeting are described and discussed in Sections 3-6 of this Report. 
Lessons
In undertaking the KFHS case study, we developed a number of methodological innovations. Specific developments in methodology developed during the KFHS case study are identified in the text above in boxes in italics. One consideration in making these developments was the desire to make use of the unusual feature of the partnership between academic and industrial partners on this case study. The other consideration was to undertake the case study in a way which would develop and test procedures which were compatible with and could inform the emergent PROTEE principles and which could thus be used as PROTEE procedures in future projects. 
Looking back over the methods used for the KFHS case study it is possible to conceptualise it in terms of three moments in the transfer and transformation of information. During the first moment, information was transferred from Uwe to Ruth and other members of the Consor​tium as Uwe told the story of the KFHS project in his own words. During the second moment, the roles were reversed. Ruth used the information provided to her by Uwe to retell to him a story, in the form of a chronology, about events in the KFHS story, resulting in a consensus version of the chronology of events in the history of the project. In the third moment there was analytic dialogue. 
We have used the three moments in the KFHS case study as the structure for the next three sections of this report which we have called the Innovator’s Story, the Consensus Story and the Socio-Techno-Therapeutic Dialogue.
These three moments have resonances with moments in the interaction between client and therapist in psychotherapy and other forms of ‘talking cure’. In the first moment of the inter​action, the client tells the therapist about his or her life, a subject upon which he or she is the expert. During the second moment the therapist retells parts of the client’s story back to the client, perhaps asking questions for clarification, and allowing the client to correct inaccura​cies and misapprehensions. This second moment prepares the ground from the third mo​ment, the moment of dialogue. Here the therapist asks the client questions about what the client has told him, questions which are based on the therapist’s expert knowledge and experience, questions which might bring new perspectives, unexplored explanations, and unsuspected dimensions on the past, present and future. 
In PROTEE, as in psychotherapy, there are two types of actors who have complementary competences: the client/Innovator who is an expert on his or her own situation; and the therapist/Evaluator whose expertise is in the use of a set of analytic tools. In both cases the therapeutic value is in the interaction; indeed, one could go further and say that insofar as PROTEE is a ‘cure’ at all, it is nothing more or less than a talking cure. Like the psycho​therapist, in the PROTEE interactions the Evaluator does not ‘do’ anything for the client/ Innovator except talk - he does not put on a bandage or find customers or fix up contracts. ​[33]​ 
It is important to clarify the concept of ‘therapy’ in the context of PROTEE. PROTEE therapy has a lot in common with marriage guidance counselling or relationship counselling. Such counselling or therapy does not guarantee the survival of the relationship. Rather, the aim with such therapy is that if the relationship is a ‘white elephant’, the parties involved will realise this sooner rather than later, and that couples who receive such therapy will have a better understanding of what is happening to them and will be better equipped to manage future relationships. It is this concept of therapy which invites the conceptualisation of PRO​TEE, particularly the analytic dialogue, as socio-techno-therapy.
The function of the PROTEE dialogue is socio-techno-therapeutic: aided by questions by the Innovator, its purpose is to encourage the Innovator to enrich their description of the project - to entertain riskier aspects of the project in their descriptions and to imagine other possibili​ties. The Dialogue is analytic, not evaluative. Although the Dialogue informs the PROTEE evaluation, it is not to be the same as the evaluation which comes later. 
Based on our experience of doing this case study, the way in which we envisage the sequence of PROTEE procedures is as follows. This sequence of procedures is compatible with the PROTEE Interview Guide: ​[34]​ 
1. 	The Innovator’s Story. The Innovator tells a story to the Evaluator. This is contained in the documentation and other material supplied to the Evaluator prior to a project meeting. The subsequent procedures, described in points 2-5 below, take place at the project meeting itself. 
2. 	The Consensus Story. The Evaluator retells the story of the project to the Innovator in the form of a summary - a chronology of events. Through this process they agree on a Con​sensus Story - an agreement about what has happened on the project since it started, or the last meeting. 
3. 	The Socio-Techno-Therapeutic Dialogue. The Evaluator and the Innovator enter into an analytic dialogue structured by questions formulated by the Evaluator to encourage the Innovator to make risky descriptions of the project. This dialogue is designed to lead to a PROTEE redescription of the project. 
4. 	The Redescription. The Evaluators and Innovators each make a record of the PROTEE redescription. The PROTEE redescription would be a record of the quality and quantity of the descriptions of the project made within the framework of the PROTEE Indicators. The Innovator and the Evaluator do not have to agree on the project’s redescription, but their respective redescriptions should address the same points. At the Working Group in Maastricht we have proposed a method for making the PROTEE redescription which involves the completion of Project Description Summary Sheets. ​[35]​ The Sheets would record a summary of how the parties redescribed the project at the time of the meeting with respect to the quality and quantity of its descriptions. 
5. 	The Evaluation. The Evaluation is the outcome of the comparison of project redescriptions made at two consecutive meetings. Clearly, it is not possible to make an Evalution at the first meeting. At the second and subsequent project meetings, however, the Innovator can compare his two redescriptions and the Evaluator can compare his.​[36]​ What is important for the Evaluation is the difference between the two descriptions. 
As we explained in the previous Section, the only set of Indicators available during the period during which the KFHS case study was undertaken were the STEMM Indicators which were designed for transport infrastructure projects. They were not suitable for the PROTEE evaluation process because they are not designed to evaluate the quality of the learning curve of the project. Therefore we could not undertake stages 4 and 5 of the above set of procedures for PROTEE projects because no suitable set of Indicators was developed within the time frame of this project. Another reason why it was not possible evaluate the KFHS case study is that a PROTEE evaluation is the outcome of the comparison of two re-des​criptions made at different time points in the project’s history. In the KFHS case study, what we had was a snapshot of the past taken from the present and it is not possible to evaluate the learning curve of a project from a single time point. 
The questions used to generate the Dialogue in stage 3 were necessarily based on a know​ledge of STEMM Indicators, rather than of PROTEE Indicators. However, we consider this to be an opportunity for learning rather than a disadvantage. In the KFHS case study we used the STEMM Indicators in a very different way to the way in which their use is recommended in the STEMM documentation. Instead of using the full set of 28 Variables, we used a much smaller set of concepts derived from the STEMM Indicators, and we abandoned the STEMM evaluation process altogether. It is possible that adapted in this way, the STEMM Indicators, based as they are on a wealth of experience about transport projects, may be a useful adjunct to the PROTEE Indicators. Whilst the PROTEE Indicators will be essential for the re-description and the evaluation of the project, the adapted version of STEMM Indicators may be an appropriate way of stimulating the Evaluator to form questions for the Dialogue. The result of using the STEMM Indicators in this way in the KFHS case study is presented in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6. 
The materials used in the next three sections were prepared for and collected from PROTEE Working Groups in Paris​[37]​ and Mondragon,​[38]​ Technical Meetings in Duisburg,​[39]​ Uxbridge​[40]​ and Essen,​[41]​ and telephone interviews. These events generated a set of material which has been used in the preparation of this Report. The set of material comprises reports prepared for Working Groups and Technical Meetings,​[42]​ reports on the discussions which took place at Working Groups and Technical Meetings,​[43]​ notes from telephone interviews,​[44]​ and additional analyses​[45]​ and documents​[46]​ on the KFHS. ​[47]​ 
3. The Innovator’s Story
The model used for developing the concept of PROTEE as socio-techno-therapy is psycho​therapy and other forms of ‘talking cures’. In psychotherapy, the interaction between client and therapist begins with the client talking about his or her own situation on his or her own terms. In this way the therapist learns about the client’s situation. 
This is also the situation at the first meeting between the Innovator and Evaluator at time zero in a PROTEE project, which is described in the Interview Guide: ‘At time zero, when the learning pact begins, the innovator should be able to describe the world in his or her own terms, and there is nothing else for the evaluator to do except to listen’. ​[48]​ However, we consider that this will not only be the case at time zero, but that each PROTEE meeting will be preceded by this moment. The starting point for each PROTEE meeting will be the information provided by the Innovator concerning progress made since the last meeting. This is the Innovator’s Story. Although as the project progresses, PROTEE envisages that the Innovator’s Story will become more PROTEEonic as the Innovator learns more about PROTEE, the first moment for each meeting will be the information provided by the Innovator - the Innovator’s Story. 
In the KFHS case study the ‘Innovator’s story’ corresponds to the data collection phase during which Uwe, representing the Innovators, was teaching the other partners, representing the Evaluators, about the KFHS project from the Innovators’ point of view.
The remainder of this section of the Report is a representation of this moment in the KFHS case study and in the PROTEE procedures. It comprises an introductory description of the KFHS told by the Innovator. This description does not, of course, represent the depth and range of material Uwe provided on the KFHS project. What it represents is the fact that at this moment in the case study, and at the moment which precedes a PROTEE project meeting, the Innovator speaks about his or her innovation project, and the Evaluator behaves like a good therapist and listens. 
The Krupp Fast Handling System
Intermodal transport is a system in which cargo is moved inside standardised boxes called Intermodal Transport Units using different modes of transport in succession without the cargo itself having to be handled or repacked. It has become a key element of modern logistics. It allows dispersed sources, even in rural areas, to be served, and it provides a way to bundle cargo for trunk haulage.
Such integrated transport chains comprise pre-haulage (e.g. by lorry), terminal transfer, main haulage (e.g. by train) another terminal transfer and end-haulage. The terminal designed for transferring Intermodal Transport Units between different modes of transport is subdivided into train operation, transshipment plant and other sectors.
The transshipment plant comprises the rail transfer area, the material-handling equipment, the intermediate storage area and the loading and travel lanes. The remaining area includes the lorry access lane, the reception and departure gates, the traffic area, buildings and tech​nical installations and service areas and depots where applicable.
The fast handling plant developed by Krupp Fördertechnik GmbH over the last few years, and already implemented in a test plant in Duisburg-Rheinhausen, has been designed to replace conventional terminals and support an increase of intermodal transport through cost-efficient and effective operation schemes. It is constructed in modules following on from the systems given below:
*	Rail transfer equipment using the "rendezvous" technique
*	Crane for HGV operation
*	Cross Conveyor
*	Compact store
*	Terminal management system (system control and information system)
The crucial innovative factor in Krupp Fördertechnik’s fast handling plant is that loading and unloading is effected, literally, "by overtaking". While the train moves slowly through the transshipment plant, the position, identity and dimensions of the Intermodal Transport Units are checked by electronic sensors initially in the preliminary zone, amended where necessary, and the appropriate instructions scheduled for the equipment located further down the line.
In the next transfer area, fast handling equipment moving alongside the train gets hold of the Intermodal Transport Units to be unloaded, lifts them from the wagon and deposits them on the cross conveyor. The Intermodal Transport Units are either transported directly to the Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) loading and unloading area or into the store via the shortest route possible. Once reloaded with different Intermodal Transport Units, the train exits the plant. Rail transfer and inter-company transport is fully automatic, and transfer to the HGVs is partially automatic. By separating the two different functions, the trains and HGVs are operated independently of each other, thus cutting out any waiting times. By implementing the "rendezvous" technique, a particularly compact transfer area is achieved and the moving train is used to sort the Intermodal Transport Units longitudinally. 
The design of the equipment used in both road and rail transfer is based on a semi-portal crane with a one-sided, spandrel-braced crane gantry. The length and position of the crane gantry can be adapted to the size of the individual transfer area in question. All Intermodal Transport Units used in combined transport, such as containers, swap bodies and semi-trailers which can be lifted by crane, can be transferred using this transfer equipment. De​pending on the type of Intermodal Transport Units involved, running times vary from approx. 35 seconds for empty containers to approx. 70 seconds for semi-trailers. The cross conveyor aisle arranged between the storage modules is used for transporting the Intermodal Transport Units between the road and rail transfer areas and to the appropriate row in the store.
Figure 3.1: Krupp Fast Handling Terminal (Model with Compact Storage)

Two storage modules are provided in the form of a compact storage system in order to store containers, swap bodies and semi-trailers inside the fast handling plant. In order to meet the variety of capacities required, the store has been constructed in modules and can therefore be configured according to the specific local demands. 
The terminal management system assumes the complex task of co-ordinating the various operational procedures in the terminal as well as providing support in the case of customer liaison (interface with railways, combined transport operators and forwarding agents), allows for the creation of status reports and provides support when planning the capacities involved.
The Krupp Fast Handling plant has been designed as a throughput plant for the high-speed exchange of Intermodal Transport Units. The use of direct trains in combined terminals which is common practice today can be supplemented by more innovative forms like liner or shuttle trains. On arrival, trains are guided out of the reception siding in the transshipment plant, entirely or partially unloaded depending on the operating program in use and then transpor​ted onwards on a through track. The plant is operated following a "flow" procedure using a transfer track. By separating rail and road operation, the Intermodal Transport Units are made available for pre- and on-carriage at any time.
4. The Consensus Story
In the first moment in the case study, described in the previous section, the industrial partner told the Innovators’ Story of the KFHS project. The previous Section represents the fact that at this moment the information flow was been from the industrial partner to the other part​ners. With respect to PROTEE procedures, this represents the moment before each PRO​TEE meeting when the Innovator speaks about the innovation project on their own terms and the Evaluator listens. It is the period preceding the PROTEE meeting when the Innovator informs the Evaluator about the project and progress made on the project since the last meeting.
In this, the second moment in the case study, the roles were reversed. The academic partner familiarised herself sufficiently well with the Uwe’s story to be able to retell it back to him and his Krupp Fördertechnik colleagues in a way which they found acceptable. 
With regard to PROTEE procedures, we envisage that the second and third moments des​cribed in this section and the next would occur at the same project meeting. Prior to this meeting, the Evaluator would have studied the information supplied by the Innovator and would start the meeting by retelling to the Innovator his or her understanding of the way in which the innovation project is progressing as a prelude to opening up an analytic dialogue on the project. 
In terms of the concept of PROTEE as socio-techno-therapy, this moment corresponds to the stage when the therapist both checks his or her understanding of the client’s situation and demonstrates to the client that he or she has been listened to and understood. In this way, the therapist not only prepares a common ground from which to begin a discussion of the client’s case history, but also builds up the client’s trust in the therapist as someone with whom the client can discuss his or her situation. 
In preparation for the retelling of the KFHS story, the diverse set of documents about the KFHS project, which comprised reports and analyses, published documents, and procee​dings of meetings, ​[49]​ were analysed and used to construct a sequence of ‘events’ in the history of the project which were arranged in chronological order. Ruth then presented her version of the chronology of the KFHS project firstly to Uwe at the session on the KFHS case study at the Mondragon Working Group, and subsequently at the Interface Meeting at Krupp Fördertechnik in Essen in December 1998 which was attended by Krupp Fördertechnik personnel (including Uwe) and academic and analyst members of the PROTEE Consortium. ​[50]​ On both occasions, Ruth invited comments and corrections from Uwe and his colleagues. These comments and corrections were incorporated into the chronology. 
With regard to PROTEE lessons from constructing the Consensus Story, the primary aim of this exercise was to create a consensus version of the project’s history. The importance of this was to provide a common base on which to build a dialogue. On neither occasion did this prove to be problematic. This aim was realised and the chronology presented below is the outcome of this process. In this respect, the exercise was a success. 
What follows is the consensus story of the KFHS project which is the product of the above process. In writing this chronology we recognise that there is no single, precise moment when the life history of a technological project starts. Whatever moment one chooses, there are always competences, knowledges and environments which precede the moment and are the context for the events described. Therefore, in selecting the point at which to start telling the story of the Krupp Fast Handling System, we are aware that this is just one of several possible points at which it could be said to have begun. What is important is that it is a starting point for dialogue on which the parties to the consensus are agreed.
The Krupp Fast Handling System Consensus Story
1990: The future of intermodal freight transport in Germany looks favourable. Conventional freight services are considered to be inadequate in the face of increasing demands and increasing awareness of environmental problems. An increase in intermodal transport is forecast together with increasing investment in intermodal terminals and system. The German Railways Deutsche Bundesbahn and Deutsche Reichsbahn (DB/DR), the intermodal operators Kombiverkehr and Transfracht and the terminal operator DUSS have agreed upon a strategy concept on transport intermodality and terminal sizes/location regions. This paper has become fundamental to the German Federal Transport Masterplan (Bundesverkehrswegeplan, BVWP) which has in parts the status of a law.
The Representative of the Shop Committee on the Supervisory Board is concerned that idea that Krupp Fördertechnik is too concentrated in the mining sector. He suggests that Krupp Fördertechnik should diversify into new markets and proposes they consider intermodal freight transport. Krupp Fördertechnik has experience of building cranes and automated systems, knowledge of logistics and know-how of intermodal transport systems and technologies. It also has capable scientific and technical staff. Moreover, Krupp Fördertechnik also has more than 40 employees who have been made redundant from the former workshops of Krupp Fördertechnik mobile cranes. 
Krupp Fördertechnik Supervisory Board agrees to examine innovation in intermodal freight transport. 
June: Krupp Fördertechnik obtains funds from the European Commission’s Regional fund for a feasibility study. This funding, which comes via the Ministry of Economy, Techno​logy & Transport of the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (MWMTV), provides a contribution for two years towards undertaking a feasibility study innovative concept for a system solution in combined transport. In parallel 40 employees made redundant from the workshops of Krupp Fördertechnik mobile cranes are retrained.
autumn: A project Steering Committee is formed. The Steering Committee comprises all 4 members of the Board of Directors, Heads of the five Krupp Fördertechnik Divisions, Department Managers and other personnel from the Logistics Division, the Represen​tative of the Shop Committee, the Representative of the Trades Union, and an external consultant who is an expert on the railways and who is also a Member of the Supervisory Board. The role of the Steering Committee is to discuss ideas, make suggestions and take decisions. Until the end of 1995, the Steering Committee meets monthly to monitor progress. It also meets more regularly on an ad hoc basis to prepare for major events, for example, offers, presentations and technical decisions. 
1991: A project Team is formed. It is located inside the smallest Krupp Fördertechnik Division - the ”Systemtechnik” Division - and is comprised of Krupp Fördertechnik​[51]​ personnel plus external consultants already known to Krupp Fördertechnik. The role of the Team is both technical and marketing. The Team is supervised by the Steering Committee and lead by one technical and one marketing manager; the technician being the head.
1 February: A brainstorming Workshop is held. Two weeks prior to the Workshop the Team was given notice to think of ideas for technological innovation in intermodal freight transport. All the ideas put forward are explained and discussed. They are modu​larised and then recombined in a matrix of 90,000 combinations, comprising different measuring, hoisting and rack service systems. 
February - summer: Step-by-step, the matrix is cleared leaving just five combinations. Sketches and then 3-dimensional sketches are made of these five options and the advantages and disadvantages of each is assessed. The combination from the matrix which most favoured by the Team is the High Rack combination which combines the rendezvous technology with a multi-storey storage system. 
summer: The first brochure KFHS is published. It features the High Rack system. 
September: The KFHS is presented to the West German national railway company, DB, for the first time. An appointment was made for detailed discussion.
November: A small scale model of the High Rack system is presented at the Euromodal Exhibition in Copenhagen. It is received favourably and Krupp Fördertechnik makes a lot of contacts with personnel from railway companies, including Mr Pällmann and his successor Mr. Kern, head of DB Goods Department.
A Working Group begins to meet. Its membership included the KFHS Team, personnel from Deutsche Reichsbahn (the railway company of East Germany), DB’s terminal subsidiary DUSS, German combined transport operator Kombiverkehr, and DB’s Combined Transport Department and Research Department. The membership of railway personnel on the Working Group is not fixed but is based on the ‘snowball principle’ whereby relevant or interested experts with responsibilities for particular aspects are invited to meetings for technical discussions. 
Figure 4.1: Picture of the High Rack System picked up from the first brochure

December 1991 - February 1992: On the initiative of Mr. Jahncke of the Management of Kombiverkehr, Krupp Fördertechnik and DB subsidiary DUSS (terminal) and Kombiverkehr (combined transport) enter into a Memorandum of Understanding on joint terminal development. DUSS is responsible for terminal planning and operation, and Kombiverkehr is responsible for coordinating intermodal traffic between terminals. 
February 1992: Research on European network implementation of the KFHS starts under the European Commission DG VII RTD Project SIMET. SIMET stands for Smart Intermodal European Transfer and aims to develop a harmonized system kernel for European terminals. It was initially based on COMMUTOR and is therefore coordinated by Technicatome.
May: The KFHS Incentive Report of the Feasibility Study (MWMTV) is presented. It was prepared by a consultant who was originally an external member of the Team. The Incentive Report covers: general information on transport; technical aspects (vehicles, wagons, intermodal transport units); handling technologies; terminal concepts; building concepts (rail operations); existing weak points in the system; competition, financial aspects, markets and EU regulation. It concludes, that innovations are necessary to key up additional volume for Intermodal Transport. Fast Handling Systems should contribute to it and its technical features should be further developed and demonstrated.
June: European Commission Regional Fund support for the feasibility study ends (see June 1990). 
end: The Team is comprised only of personnel who are internal to Krupp Fördertechnik. 
1993: The KFHS Compact Storage System is developed. It has three fields so that it can handle the same material flow as the High Rack System. The hoisting mechanism is changed from a hexapod system to a hoisting frame. 
June: Final report on the feasibility study is delivered to the MWMTV. It incorporates parts of the Incentive Report. This marks the completion of the concept phase of the project.
15 August: Krupp Fördertechnik steel plant at Duisburg-Rheinhausen in closed down. 
Krupp Fördertechnik decides to build a test plant for the KFHS on the site of the former steel plant. 
September: The MWMTV provides financial support for the test plant on condition that Krupp Fördertechnik have a Cooperation Contract with DB/DR which demonstrates DB/DR’s interest in the KFHS. 
October: Krupp Fördertechnik and DB/DR enter into a Cooperation Contract for the test plant. DB/DR support is not financial but expertise on the Working Group, own travel costs, and equipment, for example rolling stock, for the test plant. 
Krupp Fördertechnik and DB/DR sign a Letter of Intention for the joint planning and installation of a reference terminal in the network of DB/DR.
The size of the KFHS Team increases to 40 for the development and building of the test plant. It includes personnel from the former mobile crane workshop, for example, electricians and welders. 
1994
January: DB and DR merge to become Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG).
Krupp Fördertechnik makes its first commercial offer of the KFHS to DB AG. It offers both the High Rack and the Compact Storage Systems for four sites for reference terminals selected by DB AG from DB’s Master Plan for intermodal terminal develop​ment. 
DB AG chooses the Compact Storage System and selects just one terminal for detailed planning - Dresden-Radebeul. 
Krupp Fördertechnik begins planning a KFHS reference plant for a terminal at Dresden-Radebeul.
KFHS Compact System with 2 storage fields is developed to offer a less expensive solution for medium volumes required in Dresden (see Figure 3.1).
December: The KFHS test plant opens.
Figure 4.2: Opening of the Pilot Plant in Duisburg-Rheinhausen

The picture is showing B. Jahncke (Head of Unit New Systems Deutsche Bahn AG), M. Lücking (Chief Responsible of Deutsche Bahn AG for the Land Saxonia), J. Krings (Lord Mayor Town of Duisburg), H. Dürr (President and CEO Deutsche Bahn AG), F.-J. Kniola (Minister of Traffic of Nordrhein-Westfalen), H.-J. Wiedenhues (Chairman of Board of Directors Krupp Fördertechnik GmbH) and Dr. G. Cromme (President and CEO Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp) on December 8, 1994.
1995
beginning: SIMET ends concluding that a couple of compatibility criteria have to be met by technical solutions for Combined Transport in Europe and that ”smart transfer” shall be installed in conjunction with innovative rail operation concepts to create full benefits for the integrated transport chain.
DB AG change the site of the reference terminal from Dresden-Radebeul to Dresden-Friedrichstadt.
Krupp Fördertechnik begins planning for a KFHS reference plant for a terminal at Dresden-Friedrichstadt.
May: The KFHS rendezvous technology – automated unloading/reloading of a moving train - is demonstrated at the test plant to more than 200 guests (politicians, high-level ma​nagers from railways and Krupp, representatives of the respective administrations). 
The end of the Cooperation Contract with DB/DR for the test plant ends silently. It was never formally ended and all the equipment remained on site. 
The size of the KFHS Team is reduced to engineers and technicians and a few operation staff on the test site, totaling 20.
mid: A High level meeting takes place between Krupp Fördertechnik and DB AG
At the request of DB AG and in discussion with them, Krupp Fördertechnik as well as other manufacturers design competing systems for a Mega Hub Terminal which services up to six trains at a time and shall be installed in three German sites starting with Hannover, a site chosen both because of traffic flows but also due to political support for the forthcoming EXPO 2000 Work Exhibition. 
late: A new Head is appointed to Krupp Fördertechnik Logistics Division. The number of meetings of the Steering Committee starts to decline.
1996
February: Start of IMPULSE project on intermodal transport, funded by the European Commission Fourth Framework Transport Programme. Krupp Fördertechnik is the co-ordinator. One of the sub-tasks is to test the KFHS test plant and demonstrate its impact on socio-economic parameters. IMPULSE is due to end in mid 1999.
Krupp Fördertechnik develops the Trimodal KFHS to meet the requirements of integrated trimodal transport chains. The Trimodal KFHS integrates rail, road and barge transport.
Federal Ministry of Science, Technology, Education and Research (BMBF) agrees to support the development and installation of a reference plant under the umbrella of the combined transport technology platform 2000+ (KV-TP 2000+). KV-TP 2000+ is the national RTD initiative to increase intermodal transport and was presented by the Head of DB Cargo Unit, Dr. Sinnecker. The BMBF support is conditional upon Krupp Fördertechnik having the Cooperation Contract with DB AG to demonstrate DB AG’s perceived need for the KFHS reference terminal.
Krupp Fördertechnik enters into a Cooperation Contract with DG AG for an operatio​nal reference plant, the planning of sites and establishing a working group. The Cooperation Contract is under the umbrella of the combined transport technology platform 2000+ (KV-TP 2000+). However, the Working Group was late in forming, was never formally established, and had only 3 or 4 meetings. 
Engineering Contract between Krupp Fördertechnik and DB AG. In the negotiation phase, a contract was discussed which would cover engineering, building, pre-operation and operation of a reference plant. However, the Contract is only for the Engineering. Under the Engineering Contract, DB AG pays 100% of its costs of undertaking all aspects of the design and detailed engineering required to build a reference plant. DB AG receives a subvention from the BMBF for 50 per cent of its costs. 
In addition Krupp Fördertechnik carries out the optimisation of terminal operation and management system. 50 per cent of Krupp Fördertechnik’s estimated costs are also reimbursed under KV-TP 2000+.
Krupp Fördertechnik does detailed engineering for a reference terminal at Dresden-Friedrichstadt.
Independently, DB AG undertakes an internal [TO DB] study of the global aspects of combined transport, for example, the trunk network, the use of the terminal, the type of train systems.
During 1996, the Steering Committee ceases to meet. The Head of the Logistic’s Division becomes the Team’s only link with the Krupp Fördertechnik Board of Directors. 
Mid 1996 - early 1997: The site of the proposed reference terminal comes under re-nego​tiation. DB AG no longer wants the reference terminal to be at Dresden-Friedrichstadt because the intermodal volume is now estimated to be too small and DB AG’s ‘real estate’ division did not give permission for the proposed terminal on this site. DB AG terminates its plans for a reference terminal in Dresden-Friedrichstadt and decides that the reference terminal will be at Ulm instead.
1997: Krupp Fördertechnik innovates the KFHS with a ropes hoisting mechanism instead of hydraulic cylinders to allow larger lifting height.
summer: The Head of DB AG which favoured the KFHS is replaced by a politician and changes to being Head of the Supervisory Board.
December: Rumors are saying that DB AG Cargo Unit changes their Combined Transport Strategy and that in particular the volume of traffic and the capacity of the trunk line are both too small to justify building a new intermodal terminal at Ulm.
1998
1 January: Following internal reorganisation of Krupp Fördertechnik, there is no longer a Head of the Logistics Division. The Steering Committee no longer exists. The KFHS Team is directly linked to the Board of Directors, especially the Chair, who is respon​sible for Sales. Contact is informal.
15 March: New guidelines offering Federal government subvention support to third parties [= that is parties other than DB AG] for the building of intermodal terminals. This creates uncertainty over the division of responsibilities and roles in combined transport. Technical Annex to the guideline describes a conventional terminal to be subject to funding.
April: Krupp Fördertechnik completes the detailed engineering for a reference terminal at Ulm. The detailed engineering could be transferred for any potential site for the KFHS. DB AG accepts the work done by Krupp Fördertechnik. This marks the end of the Engineering Contract. 
DB AG decide that they will not build a terminal at Ulm. DB AG do not enter into a contract with Krupp Fördertechnik to build a reference plant. 
As various parts of the Engineering Contract were completed, Team members were redeployed to other Krupp Fördertechnik services. Now the Engineering Contract is completed, the KFHS Team shrinks to five people: 3 @ full time and 2 @ 50% time. 
A KFHS Compact System with just one storage field is developed as a ”least cost version”. 
mid: The KFHS Team start work on APRICOT, a research and technological development project funded by the European Commission. APRICOT is a pilot study on trimodal transport chains in West, South and South-Eastern Europe. 
27 September: General Election in Germany. The opposition parties socio democratic party (SPD) and green party (GRÜNE) come to power. The impact on government role and commitment to support combined transport are uncertain. However, another period with no fundamental decisions but a lot re-organisation, waiting and delay.
1999: The Team continues to undertake research activities on IMPULSE, which is due to end in the middle of 1999, and on APRICOT, which is due to end in autumn 1999. In addition to this it continues its efforts to find a customer for the KFHS. 
	The KFHS ”single plant variant” is especially favored by a ”third party” for an inter​modal terminus initiative in Berlin.
The test plant is going to be dismantled because Krupp has sold the land it is situated on for redevelopment. 
5. The Socio-Techno-Therapeutic Dialogue
In the second moment of the KFHS case study, the academic partner retold the history of the project to Uwe and his colleagues with the main objective of co-creating a consensus story of the project. In the third moment, this consensus story is used as a shared platform - a mutual basis - on which to build an interactive, analytic dialogue about the project. We have called this moment in the PROTEE case study the Socio-Techno-Therapeutic Dialogue. 
In terms of PROTEE procedures, we envisage that the Dialogue and the construction of the Consensus Story would take place at the same meeting. The Consensus Story is provides a shared platform upon to build the analytic Dialogue. 
The first such Dialogue took place at the session on the KFHS case study at the Mondragon Working Group. One interesting observation was that during the interaction the different orientations of the academic/analyst partners and the industrial partners in the PROTEE consortium recreated the roles of Evaluator and Innovator, respectively. ​[52]​ Another dialogue took place at the Interface Meeting in Essen, attended by Krupp Fördertechnik personnel (including Uwe) and academic and analyst members of the PROTEE Consortium. ​[53]​
The Dialogue below has been constructed from what was said at these two events. In con​structing the dialogue we have reconstituted the discussion from the events as if it were a dialogue between an Innovator and an Evaluator. The part of the Dialogue attributed to the Evaluator is an amalgam of what was said by academic and analyst partners in the PROTEE Consortium. The part of the dialogue attributed to the Innovator is an amalgam of what was said by both Krupp Fördertechnik personnel and by non-Krupp Fördertechnik industrial partners in the PROTEE Consortium. 
As was explained in section 2 of this report, in the KFHS case study we have applied the STEMM Indicators selectively. In order to facilitate dialogue, the principle organising factor is elements from the history of the KFHS project to which the STEMM Indicators have been applied selectively. In the construction of the dialogue below, the elements structuring the dialogue and the Indicators informing the questions are written in bold capital letters. 
The Krupp Fast Handling System Dialogue
CRITICITY - OUTLINES
EVALUATOR: How would you describe the story of the KFHS project?
INNOVATOR: There are really two stories, as I have illustrated in this chart which gives an overview of the of the KFHS project. From left to right is a time axis, and there is another time axis from bottom to top which also shows the different phases of the project. This chart shows the project’s turning points. ​[54]​ The green diamonds indicate positive turning points, the yellow diamonds indicate a warning signal, and red diamonds indicate negative turning points. 
All the diamonds in the concept phase and in the test plant (terminal development and testing components) phases are green. This is the first story. In the later phases all the diamonds are red. This is the second story. 
The first story is a success story. It ends with the successful implementation and putting into practice of the test plant in 1995. The second story is different. Originally we planned that from the beginning of 1996 we would start the network implementation. But today there is neither a reference plant, and nor network implementation. 
Figure 5.1: Turning Points mirrored against initial schedule

AUTHORITIES - THE GERMAN RAILWAY COMPANIES
EVALUATOR: Tell me about each of the three red turning points, starting with the red turning point at the beginning of 1997. 
INNOVATOR: This was when DB AG terminated the planning for the reference terminal at Dresden-Friedrichstadt. For the engineering contract, Krupp Fördertechnik carried out planning for four terminals. DB AG selected only one site - Dresden-Friedrichstadt - for detailed planning. So, Krupp Fördertechnik undertook all the preplanning and size calculations for Dresden-Friedrichstadt Then, DB AG Cargo Unit said that the intermodal volume was too small, and the ”real estate” division of DB AG would not agree to sell the land around the terminal to create a ”Guterverkehrszentrum” under conditions demanded by the Ministry of Transport. So DB AG terminated planning for this site and switched to Ulm. 
EVALUATOR: And what about the red turning point in about the summer of 1997?
INNOVATOR: This marks the time when the decision to upgrade an intermodal terminal in another European town was made and conventional technology was chosen. Seven reasons linked to the site itself were given explain the decision to use conventional technology, which on the face of it were good reasons, but uncertainty about DB AG’s position and about the new technology may also have played a subliminal role.
EVALUATOR: And finally, tell me about the most recent red turning point at the beginning of 1998. 
INNOVATOR: The red diamond at the beginning of 1998 was when DB AG did not sign the already negotiated contract to build a reference terminal at Ulm. All the work on the Engineering Contract had been completed and accepted by DB AG, but DB AG did not sign the Building Contract because their Cargo Unit estimated that there was insufficient volume of combined transport at Ulm to justify a terminal and the trunk line was saturated by passenger trains. And the failure to get a building contract for a reference terminal with DB AG has been detrimental to interesting other clients in the KFHS (see previous turning point).
EVALUATOR: Why was Ulm chosen as a site?
INNOVATOR: Ulm was selected from the Master Plan which identifies the location area for each combined transport terminal in Germany. The Master Plan was developed by DB, Kombiverkehr, DUSS, the Federal Ministry and the land ministries in 1993. For each region the anticipated volume of combined transport was estimated. 
For Ulm the estimated volume was 1,000 Intermodal Transport Units (ITU) per day. However, this was an unrealistically high estimate. A volume of 1,000 ITU per day would be true for only very few terminals in Germany, and certainly never true for Ulm. And so what happened was that the estimate was revised downwards to 800 ITU per day, then 400, then 200, then 140, until finally there was insufficient volume to justify building a reference terminal at Ulm and even the existing old-fashioned terminal is put into question.
EVALUATOR: How can the changing estimates of intermodal volume at Ulm be explained? 
INNOVATOR: When the Master Plan was drawn up, it was guided by the political desire to more than triple Combined Transport volume in 20 years (1990-2010) and to provide a competitive alternative system to pure road transport. Therefore a network of medium and large terminals was agreed to by all the actors. These terminals, which would replace the old terminals, were to be linked should by innovative rail operation forms. However, over time these aims were neglected and sometimes even opposed by DB Cargo persons in charge of contracting clients and concrete train operation.
EVALUATOR: Were there any other reasons why DB AG did not sign the contract? 
INNOVATOR: There is another reason why DB AG did not sign the contract for building reference terminals, which is that DB AG changed their strategy for combined transport. The change in DB AG’s strategy was due to DB’s changing role in combined transport following the privatisation of the railways. One aspect of the changes was uncertainty. For example, there is uncertainty over whether or not DB AG is a chain operator or just a trucker, whether DB AG or DUSS is in charge of terminal planning and operation, and whether DB AG or Kombiverkehr is the intermodal operator. Different opinions are expressed by different DB AG spokespersons, and even by the same spokesperson at different times. The uncertainty over its role and strategies made DB AG unwilling to invest in an innovative combined terminal.
The uncertainty over the role and strategies of DB AG is also detrimental to potential sales of the KFHS to other customers. Since March 1998, subvention support for intermodal terminals has been available to third parties. Although there is interest from such parties in the KFHS, they are cautious because of the uncertainties: who is responsible for building the terminal, who has responsibility to ensure that there is a railway line to take the train to the terminal at the right time, who is responsible for making contact with the shipping companies who use the terminal? And so there is a gridlock situation because of uncertainty over the reorganisation of roles and responsibilities, and because of changes in predicted intermodal freight volume. 
PLASTICITY - TECHNICAL CHOICES
EVALUATOR: The problems - the red turning points - you have identified are all to do with the market side of the innovation, rather than the technical side. This was the second story . Let us go back to the beginning of the first story - the success story. What made Krupp Fördertechnik think, back in 1990 and 1991, that there would be a market for such an innovation? Why did Krupp Fördertechnik choose to innovate in intermodal freight transport.
INNOVATOR: At this time in Germany, the future of intermodal freight systems looked favourable. The logistics and capacities of road freight services were considered to be inadequate in the face of increasing demands, and there was also an increasing awareness of environmental problems caused by road transport. These factors translated into forecasts that there would be an increase in intermodal transport.
EVALUATOR: The period of time from when the idea of innovating in intermodal freight transport was first suggested to the selection of the combination - the High Rack system was very rapid. How did Krupp Fördertechnik decide on this particular model for the innovation?
INNOVATOR: Between 1975 and 1981, Krupp undertook a project on freight traffic for the Federal Ministry of Transport. In this study, the key problems identified were networl design, terminal size and trans-shipment time. Conventional cranes were said to be adequate for current volume but considerable increase could be achieved with fast automated terminals and new train systems, only. In addition land became a critical factor in industrial growth and town planning in condensed areas in the early 1990th. These were the criteria we used when evaluating the combinations in the matrix. The High Rack system required a short terminal which meant that less land would be required to handle the same volume of freight, and the rendezvous technique would reduce trans-shipment time. 
EVALUATOR: Why did Krupp Fördertechnik develop a compact system for the reference terminal? 
INNOVATOR: Originally Krupp Fördertechnik wanted to use the reference terminal to test the High Rack system because they wanted to test the top of the technical range. However, in December 1993, when they gave the cost estimate to DB for a High Rack system in Dresden Radebeul, DB said no. The cost of land had fallen and as land became less expensive, the cost of building the large steel structure of the High Rack system became higher than the land costs that would be saved. 
There was also an aesthetic reason. In 1995, the site for the reference terminal was moved from Dresden Radebeul to Dresden-Friedrichstadt. Dresden is a city with many baroque buildings, and following discussion with the town architect, it was decided that a High Rack system did not fit in aesthetically. Alternative wall designs were discussed but rejected because of their additional costs.
There have been no basic alterations to the storage system since then, only modifications, for example, from a 3-field to a 2-field system and then a 1-field storage system. The other innovation has been a change in a component in the hoisting mechanism . 
CRITICITY - RISKY DESCRIPTIONS
EVALUATOR: So your description of the trajectory of the project is that the project was going well in the beginning - in the conception and terminal development phases - because all of the indicators are green, and that things only started to go wrong after 1996. 
However the absence of red warning signals, or opposition, in the early phases of the project could indicate several things. If opposition was looked for and not found, then it could mean that there was no opposition. However, the apparent lack of opposition could be due to a lack of information: it could indicate that Krupp Fördertechnik was not exploring the environment. It could also indicate that Krupp Fördertechnik was avoiding risks - risks which would alert it to and help it to anticipate the sort of oppo​sition the project is likely to encounter at a later stage, and inform its shaping of the project’s trajectory. 
ACTOR NETWORK - THE GERMAN RAILWAYS
Most of the obstacles to the realisation of this project have originated in the German railway companies, so let us examine the relationship of the German railways with the project in more detail, starting at the beginning of the project. 
The German national railway companies - at first DB and DR, and later DB AG - are crucial customers for the KFHS. Yet, Krupp Fördertechnik decided deliberately to exclude these companies from the project during the initial phases of its conception. The KFHS was not presented to the DB until September 1991, by which time a particular technical trajectory - the High Rack system with short terminal and fast handling - had been decided upon by Krupp Fördertechnik alone. Furthermore, when Krupp Fördertechnik and DB started working together, it was not on the conception of the innovation, but on the later phases. Therefore, throughout the entire conception phase of the project, which lasted until 1993, the project was entirely Krupp Förder​technik-owned. DB did not instruct Krupp Fördertechnik to find a solution. The tech​nology was not demanded by DB. The problematic was not negotiated between the lead user and the innovators. The technology was an supply-driven rather than a demand-driven. 
INNOVATOR: In the first years it was supply-driven, but the offer was based on information produced by the railway companies and leading railway consultants on the future demands on freight transport. On the basis of this demand, anticipated by DB Krupp Fördertechnik produced a technical, operational offer. DB accepted this offer and started into detailed technical discussions. 
EVALUATOR: This does not explain why Krupp Fördertechnik excluded DB from the con​ception phase. The exclusion of DB from the conception phase meant that DB had no financial stake and personal engagement in the project. It had no incentive to be committed to this innovation project rather than to others. Why did Krupp Fördertech​nik decide to exclude DB from the conception phase?
INNOVATOR: Krupp Fördertechnik had worked with DB on a logistic study on railway traffic from 1975 until 1986. From this experience we learned that the railways are very conventional in their thinking. We were concerned that if they were involved in the project too soon they would stifle its innovative potential and that they would domi​nate its development. We were also concerned that we would lose focus - that rather than having 90,000 combinations in the matrix we would have had 900,000 combi​nations. Krupp Fördertechnik also wanted to protect its interests in any patentable inventions that might be developed. So Krupp Fördertechnik’s strategy was to work on the conception phase separately from railway companies, to develop the inno​vation, make patent applications, and then go to DB. So the decision to exclude DB from the project Teach at this stage was part of a deliberate strategy.
EVALUATOR: Were the advantages and disadvantages of excluding DB from the conception phase considered at the time? And in retrospect, what does Krupp Fördertechnik think of this decision?
INNOVATOR: At the time we did not think there were any disadvantages. But today we know that there were. DB was not faithful to the KFHS. After we had presented our system it was very much appreciated, but nevertheless DB went to our competitors to see if they could develop comparable systems. Subsequently, DB developed a closer wor​king relationship with Hilgers, one of our competitors, than it had with Krupp Förder​technik. For example, one of the DB AG engineers is mentioned as a co-inventor on one of Hilgers’ patents in this area. In fact, there is a patent dispute between Krupp Fördertechnik and Hilgers in which Krupp Fördertechnik claims infringement. 
EVALUATOR: So by not enrolling DB in the technical development of the innovation, Krupp Fördertechnik was taking a big risk. The railways had no stake in the conceptual phase of the project. Therefore they had no incentive to be faithful to Krupp Fördertechnik or to see the concept through to the terminal development stage. 
CRITICITY & RETROACTIVITY - THE TEST PLANT
Figure 5.2: Pilot Plant of the Krupp Fast Handling System

EVALUATOR: Let us move on from the conception phase of the project to the development of the test plant which is pictured on the cover of this brochure. The rail side is on the left and the road side is on the right. Why did Krupp Fördertechnik build a test plant?
INNOVATOR: Mr Dürr, who was the Chairman of DB, said: ‘I will believe in the rendezvous technique when I see it done on a real scale size’. And so the test plant was built on a 1:1 scale on the railway side. ​[55]​
EVALUATOR: The test plant achieved a number of things. It demonstrated that the rendez​vous technology worked. It brought in money from the European Commission which contributed towards the cost of retraining Krupp Fördertechnik employees. It enrolled the support of the Ministry of Economy, Technology and Transport of the Land Nord​rhein-Westfalen (MWMTV) who contributed towards the costs of building the test site. It resulted in cooperation with the German railway companies through their partici​pation in the Working Group and the supply of equipment for the test plant. It also facilitated contact with potential customers, and was considered prestigious for the image of Krupp Fördertechnik.
However, couldn’t these things have been achieved if the test plant had been built in a real terminal, on land belonging to the railway companies? Why did Krupp Förder​technik choose at this stage to build a test plant on land belonging to Krupp Förder​technik rather than going directly to building a reference terminal on a real railway line? What risks was Krupp Fördertechnik trying to avoid in making this choice? By imagining these risks - the risks that the test plant avoids - the limits of what it was possible to learn from the test plant will be revealed.
INNOVATOR: There were people in the Team at that time who said: ‘Why build a test plant? Why not go directly to a terminal?’ However, others said in reply: ‘Never test such a critical technical design directly on the customer’s site because it gives too much control to the customer The customer can go in on Saturdays and Sundays to check up on things’. By building a test plant on our own site we could close the door on the customer when necessary. Also, the test plant was only 500 metres from out engineering office, where our engineers were located, and 400 metres from the work​shop where it was produced. So the location of the test plant was very convenient.
Another reason why we built the test plant on our own land was so that work could begin quickly. To have tried to have built a reference plant on land belonging to the railways would have resulted in a delay, because of the public permission procedures for implementation of large scale infrastructures. 
EVALUATOR: So the reasons for building the test plant, and for building it on land belonging to Krupp Fördertechnik were to demonstrate that the rendezvous technology worked, to avoid allowing the railway company to scrutinise the project too closely, and to speed up the process. And the test plant was deliberately designed to test just a limited part of the technology - the rendezvous technology. 
Figure 5.3: Photograph of approach to the KFHS test plant

The photograph above is from the same position as the previous photograph, only the photographer is standing further back. This photograph shows the little fence which marks the boundary of the test plant site. Instead of places for lorries to park, there is the site office and the visitors’ car park. 
Figure 5.4: Photograph of railway side of KFHS test plant and hoisting mechanism

If we look to the railway side, as is shown in the photograph above, instead of a rail network there is the old steel plant. As you can see from the picture of the conven​tional rail-road terminal below, the eventual site for the KFHS in the intermodal trans​port system is very different from the test plant site.
Figure 5.5: View of a conventional rail-road terminal

The test plant is isolated from the railway and transport environment. Its operation does not require a railway or road infrastructure. It is not dependent on the volume of freight. It does not require a client who will buy it. Because the test plant is isolated from the rail and transport environment, none of these aspects of the project could be explored and learned about through the test plant. And a key player in each of these different aspects of the rail and transport environment are the railway companies.
This is not to suggest that the reasons for building the KFHS test plant on Krupp Fördertechnik land were not good reasons, but to suggest that it might have been useful at that time to have done a thought experiment - to have imagined the risks of building the test plant in a railway terminal, and to used the risks identified through the thought experiment to anticipate future obstacles for the project. 
INNOVATOR: When we built the test plant we tried to concentrate on the very minimum. We did not want to display lorries that were to be served manually, nor did we want to display how the freight would be stored. We wanted to concentrate on the rendez​vous technology. We wanted to display the technical novelty and technical capability of the rendezvous technology. Although we were sure that the rendezvous techno​logy would work, the test plant gave us the proof that it did. 
ACTOR NETWORK - THE RAILWAY COMPANIES - THE WORKING GROUP
EVALUATOR: It may be perfectly reasonable, based on previous experience, to test out whether the technology works on land belonging to Krupp Fördertechnik. But such a strategy should have been counter-balanced by an equal investment in exploring the stability, solidity and internal organisation of the railway companies. The whole future of the project depended as much on an exploration and stabilisation of the customer side as it did on the technical side. If the German railways did not buy KFHS, then it would be sold to no one. Given how critical it was to enrol the German railway companies in the project, should not an equal amount of money should have been spent on stabilising their involvement and commitment to the project as was spent on the test plant to demonstrate that the rendezvous technology worked?
KFHS is not very innovative, but the railways were a new customer for Krupp Förder​technik. Therefore, the innovation for Krupp Fördertechnik was in the client, not the product. Krupp Fördertechnik should have split their investment on the innovation between the product and the client. 
In what ways was the relationship you had with the railway companies being stabilised?
INNOVATOR: There was the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding between Krupp Förder​technik and the DB subsidiary DUSS and Kombiverkehr on joint terminal develop​ment. Then in 1993 there was the Cooperation Contract for the test plant and a Letter of Intention for the development and installation of a reference terminal with DB and DR. There was also the engineering contract with DB AG in 1996. Contracts were being signed - the relationship with the railway companies was not in the air.
EVALUATOR: Let us look at the linkages between Krupp Fördertechnik and DB AG during the execution of the Engineering Contract. The Working Group is the one formal structure formed to shape the project in which the railways are represented. Yet, during the execution of the Engineering Contract (1996-1998) there were few meetings - only 3 or 4 - of the Working Group. What was the reason for this? 
INNOVATOR: This was the usual number of meetings for such a contract. The KFHS had shifted from being a research project to normal product management. 
EVALUATOR: So despite the fact the KFHS was an innovation in markets for Krupp Förder​technik, Krupp Fördertechnik only treated the technical part as innovative. Once the technical part was stabilised, Krupp Fördertechnik treated the KFHS as a product. As far as Krupp Fördertechnik was concerned, once the engineering contract was secured, then the KFHS was no longer an innovation project, but a product?
INNOVATOR: Yes. DB AG had also switched to normal management with the Infrastructure Department taking responsibility for building a new plant, as normal. Krupp Förder​technik deliberately kept the number of formal meetings with the client to a minimum so that the engineering contract could be fulfilled. Contact was minimised to avoid giving DB AG the opportunity to make too many changes in the specifications because such changes are costly. 
EVALUATOR: Did Krupp Fördertechnik do anything to compensate for the lack of meeting of the formal Working Group? 
INNOVATOR: Meetings are not where contacts are made. We discussed issues, such as amount of megawatts of power needed, the distance between two tracks and other structural data, etc. separately, mostly with the R&D Department which was appoin​ted as having the lead responsibility. We also had local Working Groups with persons in charge of concrete planning, for example, at Dresden and at Ulm, in order to exe​cute the public permission procedure. These persons represented the Infrastructure and Cargo Unit of DB AG.
EVALUATOR: Were there disadvantages of having so few formal meetings? 
INNOVATOR: Well, DB AG changed strategy without telling us. We would hear things unofficially before they were announced officially. For example, DB AG took the decision to move the site for the reference terminal from Dresden-Freidrichstadt to Ulm in May 1996, but it was not published until 1997. 
EVALUATOR: Clearly the railways not only had multiple identities, these identities also changed over the course of the project. The multiplicity and mutability of these identities are due to various factors, including: the merger between DB and DR to form DB AG at the beginning of 1994 and its so-called ”privatisation”; ​[56]​ the various component departments and subsidiaries of the railway companies; and the personal interests of individual railway employees in all hierarchical levels. 
The multiple and changing identities of the railway companies mean that they are both allies and opponents of the project. One manifestation of this multiplicity of identities is that whilst the DB AG is paying Krupp Fördertechnik to execute the engineering contract for the installation of KFHS in a terminal, another part of DB AG, studying the global aspects of combined transport, revised the estimated intermodal volume to such a low level that a new large terminal could not be justified.
How aware was Krupp Fördertechnik was of the various identities of the railway companies? Who were the key decision-makers with respect to the KFHS? Which of these decision-makers was Krupp Fördertechnik linked to and which of these decision-makers was Krupp Fördertechnik not linked to? How did this map of power and linkages change over the life of the project?
INNOVATOR: In 1991, the German Railway company was structured like an authority. All aspects related to railways such as infrastructures, all types of goods transport, passenger traffic, production and technologies were treated internally or through relationships with dedicated subsidiaries or affiliates. With the respect to intermodal transport there was a limited number of lead departments. Krupp Fördertechnik made contacts with and initiated discussion with all of these In addition high-level talks between the management of Krupp and DB were organised resulting in decisions which had to be executed by the employees.
Figure 5.6: Simplified Organigramm of German Railway Authority – Deutsche Bundesbahn in 1991

In the course of the Project the two German railway companies DB and DR were merged and ”privatised” and re-organised on an ongoing basis. From the outside but also for DB employees the respective responsibilities were not very clear. The paramount consideration became to end the first business year with a balanced result, the ”black zero”. This led to short term decisions with respect to long-term investments. One can speak of a vacuum of decisions taken on infrastructures.
However by the end of 1998 the situation had stabilised into three units: ”Track” which owns the infrastructures including intermodal terminals; ”DB Cargo” which owns goods wagon and locomotives and operates goods trains and ”R&D” which has become part of the central unit of the Holding. The subsidiaries or affiliates involved in combined transport remain the same.
Both ”Terminals” and ”New System Goods Transport” are dependent on the demand of DB Cargo which has become their ”client” instead of joint partner. If DB Cargo does not consider that there is sufficient volume to build a terminal at a given site, none will be built there. If DB Cargo decides to concentrate its traffic on main corridors and conventional direct trains there will be no innovations.
The Head of DB Cargo is the former controller of the unit and is more interested in mergers and acquisitions than in increasing business activities through innovations.
Figure 5.7: Simplified Organigramm of DB AG Holding with Separate Units in 1998

EVALUATOR: Did you make this analysis before you were prompted to by these PROTEE-type questions? Did you learn anything new by doing it?
INNOVATOR: The analysis of the personal relations between all actors involved was carried out in order to uncover allies and opponents. However, this exercise was difficult because the published opinion of opponents was quite different from what was experienced as their actions. This would have made it difficult to do with accuracy at the time. Another problem is that sometimes opponents were hidden inside the organisation and we were given assurances by others that we should not be con​cerned about such opposition because they would take care of it. Also, even when opponents are identified, it is not possible to get rid of them. 
EVALUATOR: What has Krupp Fördertechnik learned from this experience?
INNOVATOR: The lead customer for the KFHS was the railways and over the course of the project there were a lot of changes in the railway business: legally, organisationally and personally. The first ”innovative” promoters of the KFHS system within the railways who had a vision of the railways of the future were replaced by administrators and bookkeepers. The lesson learned from the KFHS is two-fold. One the one hand, you should not trust a company and nice letters of intention but tough contracts. On the other hand, contracts need to be supported on a person-to-person relationship because it is important that those who support the system are key decisions-takers who have the power to push through the solution internally. 
ACTOR NETWORK - MONITORING COMPETITORS
EVALUATOR: Since 1996, you have been working on the IMPULSE project on intermodal transport. As a condition of taking the role of coordinator on this project, Krupp Fördertechnik said that only companies who had already developed their intermodal technologies could be industrial partners. The only other such technology that could be found was Commutor, which was shelved in 1995. All the other technological systems were only at the paper stage. So Krupp Fördertechnik was the only hard​ware company at that time. 
As part of IMPULSE, Krupp Fördertechnik investigated the development of other trans-shipment systems. The results are summarised in the chart below. Did Krupp Fördertechnik monitor the activities of its competitors before it started work on IMPULSE? How did Krupp Fördertechnik monitor the activities of its competitors?
Figure 5.8: Competing Concepts (Generalised Cross Sections)

INNOVATOR: We monitored their activities through exhibitions; scanning technical maga​zines, screening patents and regular and intensive discussions to ”knowledge carriers”. The intermodal is a small world of experts. These activities were carried out throughout the whole KFHS Project.
EVALUATOR: How did Krupp Fördertechnik react to the activities of its competitors:
INNOVATOR: We analysed their systems and looked for technical problems. Briefly, our analysis was as follows. 
Commutor is a French transshipment system. It is much faster than a conventional manual system, but, unlike the KFHS, the trains are not moving. Whilst a conven​tional system uses one up to 3 cranes per 4x40 wagons, Commutor requires one crane per wagon and is thus expensive, but the throughput is greatly increased. A demonstration, or test plant, existed in Trappes, South West Paris. There has been no development of Commutor since 1995. Whilst Commutor is fully automated, it cannot accept conventional standard wagon but requires a completely new wagon fleet and dedicated operation forms (Hub & Spoke).
The ”Transmann” has been developed by German competitor Mannesmann Transmodal. The Transmodal Concept aims to offer a full service for intermodal transport - terminals, terminal technology, inter-terminal services. It has had a pilot plant since the end of 1997. However, it is neither automated nor fast. The concept to transship under catenary brings no additional advantage for a standing train and complicates the transshipment of semi-trailers.
Hilgers is another German competitor. It is a manufacturer of conventional portal cranes and is a crane-supplier to DB AG. In cross-section Hilgers’ system resembles the KFHS. However, in longitudinal section the two systems look different. Hilgers needs about 750m of elevated crane track whereas the KFHS is compact and requires only 200m of elevated crane track. Hilgers has not published any information to prove that it is automated and it doubtful that it is fast. There is no pilot. There exist photographs of what could be a small scale model or an artist’s impression of a small scale model. Hilgers started working on the system in 1994 in close cooperation with DB AG. There is a patent dispute between Hilgers and Krupp Fördertechnik because Krupp Fördertechnik claims that the Hilgers system is a copy of the KFHS.
Noell is also a German supplier of conventional cranes to DB AG. In 1992-1993 Noell was invited by DB to develop an automated fast handling system as a competitor to the KFHS - to avoid Krupp Fördertechnik from having a monopoly. DB did not supply funding to Noell for this. Noell has developed two alternative systems: a high bay (or high rack) and a low bay (or compact). The low bay alternative is dedicated to a hub and spoke system. Terminals are connected to each other via a hub. The idea is that 6 trains arriving at the same time will be unloaded, sorted and reloaded by large portal cranes in just 72 minutes. The idea is that extra capacity would be used for rail-road transshipment in addition to the rail-rail transfer. The aim is to automate a conventional gantry crane. Since 1998 there has been a test installation in Würzburg for a trolley and a lifting device. For the lifting device Noell has developed two anti-sway mechanisms - a pole and pyramid of ropes. Noell has imitated the KFHS in the use of a metal frame to avoid sway. Noell claim that their system is fast, but Krupp Fördertechnik do not think that it is faster than a conventional terminal, due to the large movements of crane, trolley and beam. 
ACTOR NETWORK (EXCLUSION) - COMPETITORS & THE GLOSSARY
EVALUATOR: What is striking is the way in which the competitors suddenly seem to proli​ferate. Krupp Fördertechnik had a potential advantage over its competitors because it was ahead. It developed the concept of compact, automated fast handling in 1991, and had demonstrated the technical feasibility of this concept in the test plant by mid 1995. The KFHS is the only system which uses the rendezvous technology. Krupp Fördertechnik solved the problem of sway in the hoisting system, and developed an innovative measuring system. The KFHS also has the potential to respond to increasing land costs and or freight volume with the High Rack storage system. 
However, one interpretation of what you have told us about the competitors, is that rather than being an advantage, being ahead has worked against Krupp Fördertech​nik’s interests. Instead of working with Krupp Fördertechnik, the German railways invited Hilgers and Noell to compete with Krupp Fördertechnik to avoid what they feared to be monopolistic structures. Hilgers and Noell had the advantage of being able to learn from what Krupp Fördertechnik had done. Moreover, Hilgers and Noell are able to claim that they are also developing handling systems which are compact, or automated, or fast. 
One way in which Krupp Fördertechnik could have kept its competitive advantage would have been to have set the standard for competition by defining ‘compact’ and ‘fast handling’ in relation to the KFHS. Krupp Fördertechnik should have defined what ‘compact’ is as distinct from ‘conventional’, what activities are including in ‘fast handling’, and how these activities should be measured so that ‘fast handling’ can be distinguished from ‘slow handling’. The concept of ‘fast’ could have been linked to concepts utilisation of rolling stock and space, and from there to traffic volume and reduced pollution. 
By not defining ‘fast handling system’, the KFHS faces competition from systems with very different technical specifications. The scope for competition is broad. If Krupp Fördertechnik had used the technical specifications of the KFHS to set the standards for ‘compact’ and ‘fast handling’, these standards would have clarified the rules for competition and established barriers against competition by other systems. 
Even in the Glossary on elements in the transport chain, produced in the IMPULSE project, there is no definition of ‘compact’, or ‘fast handling’. 
INNOVATOR: We recognise that it would have been advantageous to claim both ‘compact’ and ‘fast handling’ as labels for our system. However, our attempt at doing this failed. In a very early phase we called our system the KFHS. What happened then was that Noell called their system a fast handling system even though it was not fast. Krupp Fördertechnik tried to monopolise this label through publication but failed.
ACTOR NETWORK - ALLIANCES - RETROACTIVITY - COMPETITORS
EVALUATOR: The customer for the KFHS was the German railways. However, the German railways had existing alliances with two major crane manufacturers - Noell and Hilgers. Surely Krupp Fördertechnik realised that the KFHS posed a threat to these two crane manufacturers and that they might react by competing. What was Krupp Fördertechnik’s strategy in relation to Noell and Hilgers? 
INNOVATOR: Krupp Fördertechnik always imagined that it would be in competition with other innovative crane manufacturers. However, instead of evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of forming alliances with our competitors, we did a market study on the future market in intermodal transport in Germany, using data from the Federal Transport Masterplan (BVWP) and Development Plans of DB/DR. We estimated that 70 intermodal terminals would be realised, that 50 per cent of these would use fast handling technology, and that Krupp Fördertechnik would be the supplier of 50 per cent of these. This would result in incoming orders to Krupp Fördertechnik of 50 million DM per year. So Krupp Fördertechnik was confident it could gain a sufficient share of the market in competition with its competitors and establish a dedicated Division (= business unit).
EVALUATOR: This expectation did not preclude the formation of an alliance with a crane manufacturer. The innovations of the KFHS were in the rack service, and the hoisting and measuring systems. Why did Krupp Fördertechnik decide to build a crane? Did Krupp Fördertechnik explore the possibility of forming an alliance with a crane manu​facturer? For example, at the test plant stage, why didn’t Krupp Fördertechnik ask Noell or Hilgers to supply the crane?
INNOVATOR: The test plant was supported by money from the European Commission to retrain employees from the former workshops of Krupp Fördertechnik’s mobile cranes. Therefore, initially, Krupp Fördertechnik needed to create employment for Krupp Fördertechnik employees.
However, Krupp Fördertechnik cannot manufacture cranes competitively. Over the past ten years, Krupp Fördertechnik has changed from being a manufacturing company to being an engineering company and Krupp Fördertechnik’s mobile crane workshops have been closed for the past five years. Moreover the Fast Handling Device was initially not designed to be a crane but a robot as part of a large handling plant.
At the Intermodal Exhibition in Hamburg in 1993, when the first drawing of the KFHS compact system was shown, the KFHS looked like a pilot plus a conventional crane. Krupp Fördertechnik asked Hilgers whether they could supply them with the crane. It was a verbal offer. But then Hilgers developed their own system and such contacts were not furthered. 
EVALUATOR: ”Transmodal” is different from Hilgers and Noell because it aims to be a service provider. Did Krupp Fördertechnik attempt to form an alliance with ”Transmodal”? For example, could ”Transmann” be an agent for the KFHS?
INNOVATOR: Yes this is a possibility. At the beginning of 1995, ”Transmodal” presented themselves as a company which would supply the entire system and made a proposal to Krupp Fördertechnik. But ”Transmodal” was developing its own handling system, the ”Transmann”, which was in competition with the KFHS. Krupp Fördertechnik did not consider it likely that ”Transmann” would try and sell a competing system rather than its own, and so there were no further talks. 
ACTOR NETWORK - ALLIANCES - ROAD OPERATORS
EVALUATOR: The KFHS is for combined road and rail transport. Has Krupp Fördertechnik made any attempt to enrol road operators to support the KFHS because of its benefits through reduced trans-shipment time, for example?
INNOVATOR: In May 1994, on the initiative of the Supervisory Board Member of the Steering Committee, Krupp Fördertechnik did a direct mailing to truck forwarding companies. The mailing provided technical information on the KFHS, the benefits of the KFHS, and asked for collaboration and exchange of viewpoints. But there was a limited response. The attitude of the road operators is that if the KFHS is there they will use it, but they do not want to pay more for the service provided by it. After this experience, Krupp Fördertechnik decided that the role of liaison with the road operators belonged to Kombiverkehr - the intermodal operator - not Krupp Fördertechnik. 
CRITICITY - RETROACTIVITY - INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING - THE STEERING COMMITTEE AND THE TEAM
EVALUATOR: The project was directed and evaluated by: the Team, which was technical and, since the end of 1991, internal to Krupp Fördertechnik; the Steering Committee, which was broader in composition than the Team, but also internal to Krupp Förder​technik apart from the external adviser on the railways; and the Working Group, which was comprised on the Team plus personnel from various parts of DB, DR, DB AG, DUSS and Kombiverkehr, whose composition was constantly changing and which met rather infrequently. Tell me about the Steering Committee? Was it unusual for a Krupp Fördertechnik project to have a Steering Committee?
INNOVATOR: The KFHS project was the only Krupp Fördertechnik research and develop​ment project to have a Steering Committee. A Steering Committee was necessary for this project because it was totally new and at the beginning there did not exist a single organisation unit since the team was recruited form various units. Furthermore it was politically initiated and loaded with a lot of desires to diversify the Krupp Fördertechnik product range and create new jobs. In addition there was a need to integrate the external partners, e.g. the external consultant on the railways.
EVALUATOR: Was the project ever criticised, or challenged internally? Were there any parts of Krupp Fördertechnik who did not have confidence in the project or who wanted to stop it? 
INNOVATOR: There were internal critics to the Project because it is new in terms of client and technology whereas the ‘product strategy’ states that developments should only be in one or other of these two dimensions. The technology itself was also criticised because it was doubted that automated trans-shipment would be able to be demon​strated. The project was also criticised on the grounds that it would be lengthy and thus costly to sell a product into a market which is politically dominated and has monopolistic demand. 
EVALUATOR: What was Krupp Fördertechnik’s reaction to this internal criticism?
INNOVATOR: The success of the first years of the project allowed the Team to continue. However, Krupp Fördertechnik’s new policy is that if the theatre of actors for a product is big, then that is a reason for not developing that product. The only products which are developed nowadays are those which have only one client and those which do not involve politics, because politics are uncertain or unreliable. 
EVALUATOR: What were the mechanisms for external criticism of the project?
INNOVATOR: External criticism, for example, from the railways, which became known to us was reacted to technically and commercially. Persons were contacted, invited and briefed with most recent information, and their opinion were included in the specifi​cation. On the other hand, a lot of disputes regarding cost-benefit was not made public - and therefore was unknown to Krupp Fördertechnik - but influenced the railway’s internal point of view.
EVALUATOR: From late 1995 until the end of 1997, the number of meetings of the Steering Committee declined to the point where there was, effectively, no Steering Committee. This was a critical time. It was at a time when the Engineering Contract was being undertaken and the three red turning points occurred. Was there any substitution for the input of the Steering Committee to the project?
INNOVATOR: There was no longer a need for a Steering Committee for two reasons. One is that once the test plant had demonstrated that the technology worked, the KFHS became a normal product inside the Logistic Department so there was no need for a Steering Committee. The other reason is that there were no longer external views (unions, railway adviser) to be respected.
EVALUATOR: So the role of the Steering Committee was just to shape the technical aspects of the project? How were the other aspects of the project shaped?
INNOVATOR: By the Team. In addition to undertaking the Engineering Contract, the Team is also involved in marketing and sales and the utilisation of the test plant.
EVALUATOR: So the broader Steering Committee shaped the technical side of the innovation, but the market side of the innovation was left to the technical Team? Is this usual for a Krupp Fördertechnik project?
INNOVATOR: The KFHS project was unusual. Normally the life cycle of a Krupp Fördertechnik project has three phases, in this sequence: 
1. 	The Sales Department talks to potential customers; it does the market research;
2. 	The Project Department examines the technical side and makes rough designs up to offers;
3. 	The Engineering and Detailed Engineering Department fulfill the contract.
Other projects start with the planning permission and the clients. The KFHS never had planning permission, and it has no clients. The sequence of the KFHS was different. The Sales Department contacted environmental representatives and politicians rather than the client, and the client was contacted by the Project Depart​ment, whereas the engineering team made rough drawings.
EVALUATOR: Did you realise how different the management of the KFHS was at the time? 
INNOVATOR: Yes, but it was the only way to stimulate the market if the client does not ask for a tender.


6. Lessons Learned from PROTEE as Socio-Techno-Therapy
This is the second set of lessons in this Report. The first set of lessons, which were learned from the methods developed for the KFHS case study, are in Section 2. Here we shall focus on lessons about PROTEE derived from Sections 3-5. 
One of the features of the case studies in Work Package 2A is that they are a collaboration of academic/analyst partners and industrial partners who are involved in the innovation project under study. ​[57]​In developing a methodology for doing the KFHS case study, this unusual feature was treated as an asset. By exploiting this feature we could model the key relationship in the PROTEE approach, namely, the relationship between the Innovator and the Evaluator. We conceived of this relationship as having features in common with a ‘psychotherapeutic’ relationship’ (see Section 2). We called the relationship in PROTEE the socio-techno-therapeutic relationship. 
In addition to providing an opportunity for us to model the Innovator/Evaluator relationship whilst doing the case study, this diversity of partners also provides what in PROTEE terminology would be called ‘better criticity’ of our own attempts to develop and test PROTEE procedures. 
The Consensus Story
With regard to PROTEE lessons from constructing the Consensus Story, the primary aim of this exercise was to create a consensus version of the project’s history. The importance of this was to provide a common base on which to build a dialogue. On neither occasion when this was attempted - in Mondragon and in Essen - did this prove to be problematic. This aim was realised and the chronology presented in Section 4 is the outcome of this process. In this respect, the exercise was a success. 
Another hoped for outcome of this exercise was that, despite knowing the history of his or her own innovation project very well, the KFHS Innovators would gain new insights by hearing it told by an outsider. On this aspect the lesson is mixed. One of the Krupp Förder​technik employees remarked that, until the presentation of the chronology, he had not noticed the lack of meetings of the Working Group in the period from 1996-1998. ​[58]​ But apart from that comment, the feedback from Krupp Fördertechnik personnel was that whilst the experience of hearing the story of the project was pleasant and interesting, they did not learn anything major that was new from it. ​[59]​ Therefore, on the basis of this pilot of the methodo​logy, the lesson is mixed. It was pleasant for KFHS Innovators to listen to someone else telling them about their project, but, on the whole, they did not gain new insights through the experience.
For any innovation project this part of the methodology of is potentially risky because it requires that an outsider confronts the Innovators, who have been involved in decisions concerning the project from its very inception, with their own story. In the KFHS case study this was even more risky than for some other projects because not only was it a retrospective project, it was also, from an industrial perspective, a failure because it has not yet achieved its industrial aim which is to earn money through commercial realisation. This made it even more risky to confront the Innovators with the story of the project. Therefore, it might be anticipated that this stage of the methodology would be received unfavourably by the industrial partner.
However, the concept itself - the retelling of the story of the innovation project before commencing the analytic dialogue - was strongly endorsed. Indeed, the feedback from Krupp Fördertechnik was that for analysing projects retrospectively, such structuring is mandatory to assist the orientation and further discussion by the various people involved. ​[60]​ 
The Socio-Techno-Therapeutic Dialogue
Moving on to the lessons learnt from the Dialogue, bearing in mind that the question we are interested in is what does the Dialogue teach us about PROTEE, rather than what does it teach us about the KFHS project. Included in this question is a question about what the Dialogue teaches us about the Indicators used for this case study.
The KFHS is a pilot case study. The whole idea of the case studies was to test and develop the Indicators. The starting point was the set of STEMM Indicators which were developed for infrastructure projects rather than innovation projects. These were the Indicators used in the dialogue because they were all that was available at the time. For the KFHS case study it was a chicken and egg situation: it was not possible to develop the Indicators without doing the case study; having done the case study, the Indicators could be developed; but by then it was too late to use them for this case study. 
In the Socio-Techno-Therapeutic Dialogue in the KFHS case study we used the STEMM Indicators in a very different way to the way in which their use is recommended in the STEMM documentation. ​[61]​Instead of using the full set of 28 Variables, we used a much smaller set of concepts derived from the STEMM Indicators, and we abandoned the STEMM evaluation process altogether. The questions asked in the Dialogue were informed by a knowledge of the STEMM Indicators. The Consortium was aware that the Indicators used in this case study were not tailor-made for the task. However, the KFHS case study provided an opportunity to get specific feedback on these Indicators, feedback which perhaps could be used to refine the PROTEE Indicators. 
Opinions about the value of the PROTEE analysis in the Dialogue are divided between the academic/analyst partners and the industrial partner. Therefore, to uphold the principle of symmetry, we have preserved this divide by presenting these divided opinions as another dialogue. In this case, it is a dialogue about the merits, or otherwise, of PROTEE. Feedback from Krupp Fördertechnik is presented as the Industrialist Partner’s comments. ​[62]​ Responses from academic and analyst partners to this feedback from Krupp Fördertechnik is presented as the Academic Partner’s comments. ​[63]​
ACADEMIC PARTNER: What was your experience of the Interface Meeting?
INDUSTRIAL PARTNER: It was interesting and pleasant to listen to the history of the KFHS project, but the analysis did not reveal any major additional aspects. The decisions taken would have been similar if we had been PROTEE-equipped. This could be because the project was managed by a heterogeneous Team consisting of engineers and experts from various fields. Also, there were constraints because the project had to be negotiated through the various internal and external disputes involving managers, clients, supporters and opponents.
These disputes brought to the fore a variety of different criticisms, for example, technical, commercial, economic, to which the project Team had to respond. Therefore, over the lifetime of the project, decisions about the project have been taken by a heterogeneous Team in response to a variety of criticisms. Using PROTEE would not have made a big difference to the decisions we made.
ACADEMIC PARTNER: You might say this because the KFHS case study was a retro​spective case study. From the Innovators’ point of view, it is perhaps neither helpful, nor welcome, for the Evaluator to suggest, with the benefit of hindsight, how a project might have been managed differently. 
INDUSTRIAL PARTNER: The fact that it is a retrospective case study does indeed affect the analysis. With the benefit of hindsight the Evaluator can perhaps see possibilities and risks which were simply not visible at the time the decisions were taken. 
We were all involved, to some extent, in the decisions which were taken, and we are still in a position where we feel we have to defend these decisions against external criticism. We see the PROTEE Evaluator as someone who presses on potential wounds or opens old sores. He or she plays the role of an external critic and the decisions or actions criticised must be defended collectively. This is a natural, human response by the Team members. 
However, if PROTEE is reduced to the question: ‘Did you also consider ...?’, the majority of the decisions taken by the Innovators could be rationalised to the Evaluators given the information available to the Innovators at the time the decisions were taken. 
ACADEMIC PARTNER: PROTEE is not just testing whether or not this or that aspect was considered, but is interested in the way in which various aspects were considered and addressed.
Krupp Fördertechnik seemed to treat the KFHS as a purely technical innovation rather than also being a market innovation. This was despite the fact that in the early phases Krupp Fördertechnik chose to innovate in intermodal freight transport precisely because it would take them into a new market by building on existing competences. The innovation was both in the realms of the technology and the market. However, Krupp Fördertechnik seemed to focus on stabilising the technical side whilst neglecting the market side. Because of this, once the rendezvous technology had been developed at the test plant, Krupp Fördertechnik no longer viewed the KFHS as an innovation, but as a product and as a consequence, the Steering Committee fell into abeyance, and the number of formal meetings of the Working Group were deliberately minimised. The technological side of the innovation may have been stabilised, but the market side was not. 
The analysis suggests to us - whatever Class of Indicator the questions were derived from, whether it was authorities, networks, plasticity or criticity - that the German railways were critical to the success or failure of the KFHS project. 
Therefore we have come to the conclusion that the answer to question: ‘What difference would it have made if PROTEE had been used to manage this project from its inception?’, should have been that Krupp Fördertechnik would have invested an equal amount on the market side of the innovation as it did on the technological side. For example, whatever Krupp Fördertechnik invested in stabilising the technology at the test plant, for example, should have been matched by an equal amount of expenditure on stabilising the relationship with the railway companies. 
INDUSTRIAL PARTNER: Innovators have an interest in the continued support of their project until it becomes a commercial success. Therefore, for the Innovator, the question: ‘What difference would PROTEE have made to this project?’ means ‘What difference would PROTEE have made to the success or otherwise of this project? The multiple and changing identities of the German railways were simply beyond our control; there was simply nothing we could have done that would have made a difference.
Moreover, the transport market itself was changing. At the beginning of the project intermodal transport was envisaged to have a potential volume of 120 Mio tonnes, whereas now it is less than 60 Mio tonnes. Furthermore, at the beginning two conventional terminals were built at a cost of 240 million DM each, whereas now the cost of one terminal should not exceed 30 million DM. 
ACADEMIC PARTNER: PROTEE aims to increase the richness and riskiness of the project’s description, both in order to increase learning about the innovation process, and also so that money can be saved by raising the alarm sooner, rather than later, that a project is likely to fail. Therefore, when the Evaluators ask the question: ‘What difference would PROTEE have made to this project?’ they mean: ‘What difference would PROTEE have made to the learning curve of the project?’ Investing more money in learning about and trying to enrol and network with the railway companies may not have increased the likelihood that the KFHS project would have been successful in Krupp Fördertechnik’s terms, but it might have alerted them sooner that the project was unlikely to succeed given the chimaeric nature of its lead user, the German railways. 
INDUSTRIAL PARTNER: Krupp Fördertechnik does recognise the importance of the environment of a technical innovation and it recognises that the enrolment of key support persons is vital for the success of a project. However, for Krupp Förder​technik, for a product to be an innovation there has to be a technical product or process innovation as well as innovation of customers or market. 
In fact, PROTEE lacks the very indicators - the ‘classical indicators’ - that are normally associated with innovation, for example, novelty, innovation, progress beyond the state of the art, differences with respect to the current situation and competitors, potential clients, market volume (market depth), use of the innovation for other applications (market range), synergies with existing products or clients, consistency with strategies (global objectives).
ACADEMIC PARTNER: PROTEE is not supposed to duplicate classical indicators. PROTEE takes these ‘classical indicators’ into account in the substantive descriptions of the project and in the ‘trials’ undertaken to test the project’s description. 
INDUSTRIAL PARTNER: Conventionally, the industrial viewpoint on market analysis, the derivation of research and technological development/'innovation' strategy and project control are determined by 'classical' factors, or indicators. The use of 'soft' PROTEE Indicators is therefore considered to be an additional task, and not a substitute for using 'classical' indicators. Providing information for PROTEE Indicators is seen as additional work for the Innovator which must be undertaken in addition to work required to meet the internal management's requirements regarding the novelty of the project and project control. We only have experience of STEMM-adapted Indicators, not the finally developed PROTEE Indicators. Based on our experience of the STEMM-adapted Indicators used in this case study, the value of this additional work is not obvious to the project manager
PROTEE is an Evaluator’s tool which aims to engender risky descriptions. Risky descriptions are not usually in an Innovator’s interests, either internally or externally. Internally, the aim is to reduce risks by not mentioning them or highlighting positive effects. Externally, the project description has to strike a balance between confidence and risk, if it is to be supported. 
ACADEMIC PARTNER: In a future PROTEE world, where projects are given public support because their descriptions are risky, then making a risky description will be less risky for the Innovator. 
INDUSTRIAL PARTNER: If this were the case, project Teams might be obliged to have two complementary sets of arguments about the project. The normal ones, that are missing from the PROTEE set of Indicators but which constitute the substantive description of the project and which would be used for relating to a company’s hierarchy; and ‘procedural ones’ which produce risky descriptions for discussing the project with PROTEE-equipped public promoters who reward risky descriptions. 
ACADEMIC PARTNER: This implies that Krupp Fördertechnik would only generate risky descriptions in order to satisfy an external PROTEE Evaluator, and that it does not consider that risky descriptions are in and of themselves of value for internal use when managing an innovation project. 
INDUSTRIAL PARTNER: PROTEE may be more easily adopted by public authorities than by private enterprises. Consider PROTEE’s valorisation of branched paths, number of alternatives, and maintenance of flexibility, for example. In private enterprises, what is valued is a focused concentration and a timely realisation. Maintaining a large amount of openness and flexibility until the very end of a development runs the risk of losing track and not meeting the concrete objective. More concretely, starting with a High Rack system and ending with a gantry crane is not an acceptable outcome of a large plant making company, even if the process generates a lot of learning and collaboration which satisfies public promoters. 
ACADEMIC PARTNER: It is certainly true that it would be naïve not to recognise that public administrators have different values from private enterprises. A company executive is trying to develop a profit generating new system, whereas a public administrator is trying to explore the feasibility of new solutions. 
For the public administrator, PROTEE provides a way to measure the risks taken. But surely this is also of benefit for the private company? Innovation involves uncertainty, complexity, and risks. For this reason, it is preferable that the criteria of success for an innovative project should focus on process - as in PROTEE - rather than on substantive issues - as with ‘classical indicators’. 
We appreciate that this would be a cultural change, and that changing the culture of project management is certainly a big task. Perhaps, for this reason, it might be easier to introduce the PROTEE type cultural change into a newly-created company rather than a large established company. 
In keeping with our approach throughout this report, we shall not attempt to give a meta-narrative on the above dialogue. We do not privilege the voice of either the academic or the industrial partners in this report. Rather, we leave it to the reader to make up his or her own mind.
However, there are five important lessons which can be derived from the above dialogue. 
The first is that it once again validates the value of having both industrial and academic/ analyst partners in a case study. It enables us to apply the PROTEE concept of criticity to our own project. By exploiting the divide between the two types of partners, we are able to generate risky descriptions of our own innovation project which is PROTEE itself.
The second is that the evaluation of PROTEE as applied to the KFHS project is complicated by the fact that the project was retrospective rather than ongoing. For the reasons articulated by both Innovators and Evaluators, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make a judgement in the present about what difference it would have made had PROTEE been applied to the project in the past. Perhaps it is not humanly possible to undertake the sort of retrospective thought experiment implied by the question. ‘What difference would it have made if PROTEE had been used to manage this project from its inception?’ given that all the parties to the case study - both Innovators and Evaluators - have the benefit of hindsight. More specifically, the fact that the KFHS project is retrospective complicates the evaluation of the Indicators used in this case study. 
This case study both developed and tested a methodology for PROTEE and adapted and tested the suitability of STEMM Indicators for innovation projects. The third lesson distinguishes between the PROTEE methodology and the Indicators used in this case study. It is important to note that all the criticisms made by the industrial partner were of the Indicators rather than the methods developed for and tested in the case study. It was not the PROTEE methodology which attracted the criticisms of the industrial partner, but the Indicators that were used. The lesson from this case study is that the STEMM Indicators simply do not address or assess either the learning aspects which PROTEE claims are specific to an innovation project nor the success of such a project. This explains why, from the industrial perspective, the added value of using PROTEE was not obvious.
The fourth lesson is that whilst risky descriptions may be of value to public administra​tors, their value for private companies is strongly contested. This means that private companies may be likely only to adopt risky PROTEE-like descriptions when under pressure to do so, for example if it was a necessary criterion for obtaining public support, rather than because they consider risky descriptions to be of intrinsic value to the innovation process.











^1	  Research Fellow, Centre for Research into Innovation, Culture and Technology (CRICT), Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK.
^2	  Research Assistant and Project Manager, Krupp Fördertechnik GmbH, Logistics Department, Essen, Germany
^3	  See Technicatome, Piloting Document of the Project PROTEE (11 February 1998), p. 5. 
^4	  ‘PROTEE General Interim Report No. 1’ PROTEE Progress Report No. 1 (14 October 1998), p. 2. 
^5	  See Latour, B. and Martin. S. PROTEE Interview Guide: Being a Presentation of PROTEE’s Principles and Indicators (18 November 1998).
^6	  With respect to the ‘Krupp Case’ Technicatome appeared in the role of an ‘analyst’ rather than an ‘industrialist’ or ‘innovator’ which role they have in their “business life”.
^7	  As was noted in the General Interim Report No. 1 op. cit, p. 4. 
^8	  Piloting Document, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
^9	  Ibid.
^10	  Technicatome, St-cls-1.doc, St-cls-2.doc, St-cls-3.doc, St-cls-4.doc. (1 March 1998).
^11	  See Minutes of the PROTEE Working Group, Paris, 8 April 1998. The changes are summarised in McNally, R. PROTEE and STEMM on 2 Pages (May 1999).
^12	  See Minutes of the PROTEE Working Group, Mondragon, 16-19 September 1998.
^13	  Latour and Martin, op. cit., pp. 13-27.
^14	  Based on Technicatome, (March 1998), op. cit.
^15	  Op. cit.
^16	  Sondermann, U. Application of Indicators - KFHS, (April 1998).
^17	  PROTEE Technical Meeting, Krupp Fördertechnik, Duisburg, Germany, 26 May 1998. Consortium members present were Ruth McNally, Uwe Sondermann, Philippe Laredo, Solange Martin, Wiebe Bijker, Anique Hommels.
^18	  Krupp Fördertechnik brochure on Krupp Fördertechnik; Krupp Fördertechnik brochures on the KFHS; Bruckmann, H-G. ‘The Krupp Fast-Handling System’, Krupp Technische Mitteilungen (January 1996); IMPULSE Newsletters Nos 1-5; IMPULSE Glossary of Elements in the Transport Chain, SGKV Report, ‘Rationeller Transport No. 45 (February 1998).
^19	  The proceedings are recorded in: McNally, R. PROTEE: KHFS Interview, Paris, 8 April 1998 (6 August 1998); and McNally, R. Fusion of notes by Laredo, Martin, Bijker, Hommels and McNally from KFHS Technical Meeting, Duisburg, 26 May 1998 (6 August 1998).
^20	  This conception of PROTEE was still prevalent at the Working Group in Mondragon in September 1998 during which a Work Shop to test Technicatome’s ‘Event forms’ was conducted. 
^21	  Sondermann, U. Application of Indicators - KFHS (August 1998).
^22	  McNally, R. PROTEE: KHFS Interview, Paris, 8 April 1998 (6 August 1998); and McNally, R. Fusion of notes by Laredo, Martin, Bijker, Hommels and McNally from KFHS Technical Meeting, Duisburg, 26 May 1998 (6 August 1998); Krupp Fördertechnik brochure on Krupp Fördertechnik; Krupp Fördertechnik brochures on the KFHS; Bruckmann, H-G. ‘The Krupp Fast-Handling System’, Krupp Technische Mitteilungen (January 1996); IMPULSE Newsletters Nos 1-5; IMPULSE Glossary of Elements in the Transport Chain, SGKV Report, ‘Rationeller Transport No. 45 (February 1998); Sondermann, U. Application of Indicators - KFHS, (April 1998); Sondermann, U. Application of Indicators - KFHS (August 1998). 
^23	  Technicatome (March 1998), op cit.
^24	  McNally, R. PROTEE and STEMM on 2 Pages, (May 1998).
^25	  Technicatome (March 1998), op cit. 
^26	  The focus of the Meeting was discussion of Ruth McNally’s draft report for the Mondragon Working Group interaction - see McNally, R PROTEE Applied to KFHS, Technical Meeting, Brunel University, 8 September 1998. The proceedings of the meeting were reported in McNally, R.KFHS Technical Meeting at Brunel University: Summary of Discussion (13 September 1998). The Technical Meeting prompted a telephone interview to clarify some details about the KFHS project, and is reported in McNally, R. Notes from Telephone Interview with Uwe Sondermann, 11 September 1998 (12 September 1998).
^27	  The presentation was based on McNally, R. PROTEE Applied to KFHS, Working Group, Mondragon, 18 September 1998. All partners were supplied with a copy of the report to use during the session. For commercial confidentiality reasons, industrial partners were asked to return the report at the end of the session. 
^28	  See McNally, R. PROTEE Applied to KFHS, Working Group, Mondragon, 18 September 1998.
^29	  See McNally, R. KFHS: Notes from Mondragon Working Group 17-19 September 1998 (8 December 1998). See also PROTEE Progress Report No. 1, op. cit.
^30	  Latour and Martin, op cit.
^31	  Krupp Fördertechnik personnel present were: Manfred Lucking, Head of Department of Mechanical Engineering; Torsten Hein (Collaborator in the RTD Department) representing Dieter Schrix, Head of Department ”Automation” (Electronic Engineering); Dieter Zimek, Head of Department, Logistics and Systems Engineering; Volker Zimmermann, Responsible for Contracting and Commercial Operation, Employee of the Sales Department. Members of the PROTEE Consortium present were Ruth McNally, Philippe Laredo and Solange Martin. Uwe Sondermann, who is both Krupp Fördertechnik personnel and a member of the PROTEE Consortium was also present. 
^32	  McNally, R. PROTEE Applied to KFHS, Technical Meeting, Krupp Fördertechnik, Essen, 11 December 1998
^33	  The provision or withdrawal of funding is not per se part of the PROTEE interaction 
^34	  Latour and Martin, op cit
^35	  McNally, R. PROTEE Methodology: Project Description Summary Sheet and Project Learning Curve Summary Sheet, Presentation at the PROTEE Working Group, Maastricht, 14 January 1999.
^36	  We have designed a form, or sheet for recording this Evaluation. See PROTEE Project Learning Curve Summary Sheet in McNally, ibid.
^37	  PROTEE Working Group, Centre de Sociologie d l’Innovation, Ecole Nationale Superieure des Mines, Paris, France, 8 April 1998. 
^38	  PROTEE Working Group, Mondragon Cooperacion Cooperativa, Mondragon, Spain, 16-19 September 1998.
^39	  PROTEE Technical Meeting, Krupp Fördertechnik, Duisburg, Germany, 26 May 1998. Consortium members present were Ruth McNally, Uwe Sondermann, Philippe Laredo, Solange Martin, Wiebe Bijker, Anique Hommels.
^40	  PROTEE Technical Meeting, Centre for Research into Innovation, Culture and Technology, Brunel University, 8-9 September 1998. Consortium members present were Ruth McNally, Steve Woolgar, Philippe Laredo and Solange Martin.
^41	  PROTEE Technical Meeting, Krupp Fördertechnik, Essen, Germany, 11 December 1998. This was the KFHS case study Interface Meeting. Consortium members present were Ruth McNally, Uwe Sondermann, Philippe Laredo and Solange Martin. Also present were Manfred Lucking, Dieter Schrix, Dieter Zimek and Volker Zimmermann from Krupp Fördertechnik.
^42	  Sondermann, U. Application of Indicators - KFHS (April 1998); McNally, R. PROTEE Applied to KFHS, Technical Meeting, Brunel University, 8 September 1998; McNally, R. PROTEE Applied to KFHS, Working Group, Mondragon, 18 September 1998; McNally, R. PROTEE Applied to KFHS, Technical Meeting, Krupp Fördertechnik, Essen, 11 December 1998; McNally, R. Report on the KFHS Interface Meeting, Working Group, Maastricht 15 January 1999.
^43	  McNally, R. PROTEE: KHFS Interview, Paris, 8 April 1998 (6 August 1998); McNally, R. KFHS: Fusion of notes by Laredo, Martin, Bijker, Hommels and McNally from KFHS Technical Meeting, Duisburg, 26 May 1998 (6 August 1998); McNally, R. KFHS Technical Meeting at Brunel University: Summary of Discussion (13 September 1998); McNally, R. KFHS: Notes from Mondragon Working Group 17-19 September 1998 (8 December 1998); McNally, R. KFHS: Notes from Interface Meeting, Essen, 12 December 1998 (26 February 1999); 
^44	  McNally, R. Notes from Telephone Interview with Uwe Sondermann, 11 September 1998 (12 September 1998); McNally, R. Notes from Telephone Interview with Uwe Sondermann, 21 January 1999 (21 January 1999).
^45	  Sondermann, U. Application of Indicators to KFHS, August 1998; Sondermann, U. Feedback on Mondragon Report (30 September 1998); Sondermann, U. Feedback from PROTEE Interface Meeting, Essen December 12 1998 (January 1998).
^46	  IMPULSE Newsletters Nos 1-5; IMPULSE Glossary of Elements in the Transport Chain, February 1998; Bruckmann, H-G. The Krupp Fast-Handling System (January 1996); Krupp Fördertechnik brochures on the KFHS; Krupp Fördertechnik brochure on Krupp Fördertechnik.
^47	  Copies of all of these materials were made available to partners in the PROTEE consortium apart from the industrial partners, for commercial confidentiality reasons.
^48	  Latour and Martin, op. cit. p. 8.
^49	  McNally, R. PROTEE: KHFS Interview, Paris, 8 April 1998 (6 August 1998); and McNally, R. Fusion of notes by Laredo, Martin, Bijker, Hommels and McNally from KFHS Technical Meeting, Duisburg, 26 May 1998 (6 August 1998); Krupp Fördertechnik brochure on Krupp Fördertechnik; Krupp Fördertechnik brochures on the KFHS; Bruckmann, H-G. ‘The Krupp Fast-Handling System’, Krupp Technische Mitteilungen (January 1996); IMPULSE Newsletters Nos 1-5; IMPULSE Glossary of Elements in the Transport Chain, SGKV Report, ‘Rationeller Transport No. 45 (February 1998); Sondermann, U. Application of Indicators - Krupp Fast Handling System (August 1998). 
^50	  Krupp Fördertechnik personnel present were: Manfred Lucking, Head of Department of Mechanical Engineering; Torsten Hein (Collaborator in the RTD Department) representing Dieter Schrix, Head of Department ”Automation” (Electronic Engineering); Dieter Zimek, Head of Department, Logistics and Systems Engineering; Volker Zimmermann, Responsible for Contracting and Commercial Operation, Employee of the Sales Department. Members of the PROTEE Consortium present were Ruth McNally, Philippe Laredo and Solange Martin. Uwe Sondermann, who is both Krupp Fördertechnik personnel and a member of the PROTEE Consortium was also present. 
^51	  Strictly speaking, at that time it is Krupp Industrietechnik which later became Krupp Fördertechnik. 
^52	  See McNally, R. KFHS: Notes from Mondragon Working Group 17-19 September 1998 (8 December 1998). See also PROTEE Progress Report No. 1, op. cit.
^53	  Krupp Fördertechnik personnel present were: Manfred Lucking, Head of Department of Mechanical Engineering; Torsten Hein (Collaborator in the RTD Department) representing Dieter Schrix, Head of Department ”Automation” (Electronic Engineering); Dieter Zimek, Head of Department, Logistics and Systems Engineering; Volkswirt Volker Zimmermann, Responsible for Contracting and Commercial Operation, Employee of the Sales Department. Members of the PROTEE Consortium present were Ruth McNally, Philippe Laredo and Solange Martin. Uwe Sondermann, who is both Krupp Fördertechnik personnel and a member of the PROTEE Consortium was also present. 
^54	  This concept of ‘turning points’ was prevalent in PROTEE in the early stages, including in May 1998, when Uwe was asked to use this concept to analyse the history of the KFHS project. The analysis presented here dates from that time. However, this approach was later abandoned by both the KFHS case study and by the Consortium as a whole.
^55	  The railway side is a description of a place in an intermodal terminal. It contrasts with the road side of the terminal. 
^56	  The State is still the only share holder.
^57	  One disadvantage of having several industrial partners each of which is innovating in intermodal freight transport, is that issues of commercial confidentiality could pose a problem, for example, in the disclosure of material or discussions at Consortium Working Groups. This problem is not, of course, unique to PROTEE and is a feature of many European-Commission supported projects. In the KFHS case study the industrial partner was given control over which information was confidential and for the academic partners only, and which information could be divulged to the other industrial partners, and issues of commercial confidentiality did not prove to be an obstacle to the development of the case study in a way in which it would benefit the Consortium. 
^58	  McNally, R. KFHS: Notes from Working Group, Mondragon, 17-19 September 1998 (8 December 1998), pp.7-8.
^59	  Sondermann, U. Feedback from PROTEE Interface Meeting, Essen, December 12 1998 (January 1999).
^60	  Sondermann, U. (January 1999), op cit
^61	  See Technicatome, March 1998, op. cit.
^62	  Sondermann, U. (January 1999), op cit
^63	  Laredo, P. (25 January 1999); Martin. S. (31 January 1999); plus additional feedback from McNally.
